By Musa Abdulmuhsin Sahban
INTRODUCTION
By adopting the wordings of the provision of section 28 of the Evidence Act 2011, a confession is an admission made at anytime by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. A confession, like any other admission, can be given orally, in writing, by conduct, or in any other circumstance that allows a proper inference to be formed against the maker. Confessions are typically made to police officers or other investigators as a consequence of interrogation, although they can also be made to the victim of an offense, a friend or relatives, or any other person. Confessions may be judicial or extra–judicial in nature. Confessions made in court during the course of the procedure are referred to as judicial confessions while extra–judicial confessions are confessions made out side the court in the course of an investigation.
THE SUPREME COURT’S RULLING IN THE CASE OF F.R.N VS AKAEZE.
In the case of F.R.N vs AKAEZE [2024] 12 NWLR (pt.1951) 1 S.C. the supreme court upheld the decision of the court of appeal holding that, extra–judicial statements of accused persons should be rejected in evidence if it fails to comply with sections 15(4) and 17(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (2015) respectively, without having regard to the general provisions of the Act and particular provisions of sections 491 and 492 of the Act.
In the case, the respondent and two other persons were arrainged before the trial federal high court on two counts charges of conspiracy and failure to declare the sum of $102,885 ( One hundred and two thousand, Eight hundred and Eighty Five thousand Dollars) to the Nigerian custom service at Muritala Muhammed airport Lagos. Contrary to sections 3(3), 8(5), and 18 of the money laundering and (prohibition) Act, 2011 (as amended) by Act No. 1 of 2012. In the course of the trial, the prosecution sought to tender the extra–judicial statements of the respondent through the prosecution witness. But the respondent objected to the admissibility of the statements on the ground that the extra–judicial statements were confessional statements made involuntarily and with no compliance with sections 15(4) and 17(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. The trial court admitted the extra–judicial statements in evidence stated that it was voluntary and made in line with the law. The respondent appealed to the court of appeal against the decision of the trial court. The court of appeal held in favor of the respondent that the extra–judicial statements of the respondent should be rejected because it does not comply with the provisions of sections 15(4) and 17(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. The appellant however appealed to the supreme court, the supreme court in determining the appeal considered the provisions of section 15(4) and 17(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015.
The supreme court in its ruling held that sections 15(4) and 17(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 impose a duty on public functionaries (police officers and other officers of any law enforcement agency established by an Act of the National Assembly and this includes the economic and Financial Crimes Commission) to record electronically, on retrievable compact disc or such other audio visual means, the confessional statements of a suspect and to take statements of suspects in the presence of the person set out in section 17(2). The provisions are for the benefit of private citizens who are suspected of committing crimes so that the enormous powers of the police or other agencies may not be abused by intimidating them or bullying them in the course of taking their statements. The provisions of sections 15(4) and 17(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 have strictly provided for recording the statement of a defendant. Thus, the failure to perform the act in accordance with the dictates of those provisions of the law would be deemed to be a flagrant non–compliance with the law. In such a situation, the court would be entitled to invoke its interpretative jurisdiction to hold that the non–compliance with the law is against the recalcitrant party. In other words, where the provisions of sections 15(4) and 17(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 are not complied with, the trial court is obliged to reject the confessional statements made by an arrested suspect.
The Supreme court further held that, the general principle of interpretation is that the use of the word “may” in sections 15(4) and 17(1),(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 connotes permissive action. But the courts would interprete the word “may” as mandatory wherever it’s used to impose a duty upon a public functionary to be carried out in a particular form or way for the benefit of a private citizen. And relying on the mischief rule of interpretation, a decision that the word “may” in sections 15(4) and 17(1), (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 has discretionary or permissive meaning would not suppress the mischief the provisions are aimed at curing nor would it advance the remedy for it. It would also not add force and life to the cure, rather it would add strength to the mischief and that would not be in the public interest. In other words, given the objective of the provisions, to give a permissive interpretation to the provisions would mean that the legislature gave a cure to the mischief with one hand and also took away the cure with other hand. That would reduce the provisions to futility and defeat their purpose. In the circumstance, the use of the word “may” in sections 15(4) and 17(1) & (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 is mandatory and not permissive.
The Supreme court’s ruling in the case of F.R.N vs AKAEZE has laid to rest the controversy accrue to the admissibility of an extra–judicial statement of an accused person as an evidence in trial courts. The supreme court has made a compelling judgement in interpreting the provision of Section 15(4) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. Due to the objection from the defense party that the circumstances and the manners to which the law enforcement agency obtain an extra–judicial confession from the accused person are brutish and nasty i.e not voluntarily obtained In other words acquired through compulsion or duress.
Section 15(4) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 provides for the circumstances in which a confessional statement of an accused person can be obtained by the law enforcement agencies in upholding the course of justice—which shall be in writing and may be recorded electronically on a retrievable video compact disc or such other audio visual means. However, It appears in plethora of cases that confessional statement of an accused person tenders before a trial court by the prosecuting party through the law enforcement agencies is always in writing. It do lend its blind eye to the concluding part of the provision of section 15(4) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. While giving an objection weapon to the accused party to question the admissibility of an accused confessional statement in evidence before the trial court. Turning out as a delay to the course of justice.
The supreme court has however made a clear and decisive ruling on the interpretation of sections 15(4) & 17(1),(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 that the use of the word “may” in the said sections shall be interpreted by courts as mandatory wherever it’s used to impose a duty upon a public functionary to be carried out in a particular form or way for the benefit of a private citizen. And relying on the mischief rule of interpretation, a decision that the word “may” in sections 15(4) and 17(1), (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 has discretionary or permissive meaning would not suppress the mischief the provisions are aimed to cure— these lead to the question; what mischief does the provisions of sections 15(4) & 17(1),(2) tend to cure. The provisions of both sections in a simple and concise term tend to mend the gap to the lime of justice draw to it by the awful circumstances to which an extral–judicial statements of an accused person are allegedly and mostly obtained by the law enforcement agencies.
The Nigeria law enforcement agencies, e.g the Nigerian police force, the economic and Financial crimes commission, are found and said to do adhere parlty to the provision of section 15(4) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 without credence to the concluding part of the said section and this has often times turns out to shambles the mischief the section tends to ameliorate.
CONCLUSION
The supreme court’s judgement in F.R.N vs AKAEZE serves as a perfect precedent to the admissibility of an extra–judicial statements of an accused person as an evidence in trial courts, in which an extral–judicial statement of an accused person that fails to strictly comply with the provisions of sections 15(4) & 17(1),(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 will be rejected before the trial court if objected to by the defense party. It will also compel the law enforcement agencies to adhere to provisions of the said sections in whole and not in part. With these, the length of time trial within trial often times tags with the course of justice in determining whether or not an extra–judicial statement of an accused person Is voluntary and in line with the law would be minimal and this would contribute to the revival of justice in our judicial system. As justice delayed is justice denied.
Musa Abdulmuhsin Sahban is a law student at Umanu Danfodiyo University Sokoto. musaabdulmuhsin569@gmail.com; 08039857571.