By Carrington Osarodion Omokaro, Esq.
While it seems the Supreme Court sought to ensure that substantial justice prevails over technicalities, it is respectfully submitted that the Court ought to have been more detailed and expressly deprecated the manner in which the Statement of Claim was signed.
The suit in Olowe v. Aluko (2025) LPELR-81320 was instituted in 1994 under the Osun State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of 1988. The writ was signed by “Akin Olujimi, Esq.” The controversy, however, concerned the Statement of Claim, which was signed in the name of “Akeredolu and Olujimi.” Consequently, the issue of jurisdiction, as canvassed by the Appellant, does not arise at all. I shall explain why.
It is settled that there is a distinction between a writ of summons and a statement of claim. The former is an originating or initiating process, while the latter is not.
In Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521, the issue pertained to the validity of a motion seeking leave to file a cross-appeal. That motion was signed by J.H.C. Okolo, SAN & Co., and the accompanying Notice of Cross Appeal bore the same signature. The Supreme Court held the process to be incompetent on that basis.
There are at least two cases to my knowledge where the issue of an “incompetent” Statement of Claim has been addressed:
1. Bakare v. Ogundipe (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1768) 1 — where Eko, JSC (as he then was) observed:
“I need only to make a few comments in support. A Statement of Claim is not an originating process. It is a process filed subsequent to the Writ of Summons…. A defect in the settlement of the Statement of Claim or the Statement of Claim itself is generally regarded as a mere irregularity…. I should think it is now inequitable and unjust to the Plaintiff/1st Respondent for this Court to accede to this belated objection; the Appellant having waived his right of timeous objection to the irregular Statement of Claim. Delay defeats equity. All the Defendants, including the Appellant, at pages 245–249 and 262–265 of the Record, filed their respective Statements of Defence, wherein they joined issues on the substance of the dispute with the Plaintiff/1st Respondent. Evidence at trial was called on the pleadings. The trial Court delivered judgment based on the evidence and the pleadings. The Appellant, finding no cause to challenge the Statement of Claim, remained mute both at the trial Court and the lower Court. He has clearly waived his right of objection to the irregular process.”.
2. Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Bentworth Fin. (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1625) 425.
From the above decisions, it is clear that procedural irregularities must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In Olowe v. Aluko (Supra), it appears the issue of the Statement of Claim’s incompetence was raised for the first time at the Supreme Court. The issue was not canvassed at the Court of Appeal, as evident in the judgment delivered in Olowe & Anor. v. Aluko (2014) LPELR-24235(CA), on 8th December 2014.
Deprecating the Manner of Signing the Statement of Claim in the Name of “Akeredolu and Olujimi”
While the Statement of Claim was signed in the name of Akeredolu and Olujimi, the Supreme Court stated that both are recognised legal practitioners. One might be inclined to accept this reasoning, especially considering that, by virtue of Section 122(j) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (in pari materia with Section 74 of the Evidence Act, 1990), the Court is entitled to take judicial notice of all legal practitioners.However, in Habu v. Sule (2025) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1974) 569, the Supreme Court, in interpreting the phrase “& Co.”, held:
“The name I.A. Yusuf is a personal name, but when ‘& Co.’ is added, it becomes the name of a partnership or business name under our law, and not a personal name.”On that logic, it follows that “Akeredolu and Olujimi” is not a personal name. Rather, it is a partnership or business name, even though it does not include “& Co.”
Furthermore, in Okafor v. Nweke (2025) LPELR-80294(SC), delivered on Friday, 17th January 2025, the Court reiterated that a signature must portray the name of the person who inscribed it, for the purpose of accurate identification and proper authentication. Therefore, even if a signature appeared above the name “Akeredolu and Olujimi”, one would reasonably ask: was it the signature of Akeredolu or of Olujimi? That kind of doubt should never arise in legal proceedings.
Also relevant is N.U.C. v. Uyo (2023) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1910) 309, where Georgewill, JCA stated thus at page 360-361 para H-A:
“My Lords, the law as it stands today, unless and until it is overturned by the apex court, is that any court process for that matter, not just originating processes only, not verifiable to have been signed by either party himself or his legal practitioner is incompetent and therefore, liable to be struck out. Thus, it is no longer only when a court process is signed in the name of a law firm that it is incompetent, it is also incompetent when it is signed by no verifiable person or not signed at all. See SLB Consortium v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317 @ pp. 336-337.”
Conclusion
Legal practitioners must not misconstrue the decision in Olowe v. Aluko as authorising or endorsing the practice of signing court processes in an unascertainable or anonymous manner.
As Onnoghen, JSC (later CJN) warned in Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521, after striking out an incompetent motion:
“The effect of the ruling is not to shut out the applicants, but to put the house of the legal profession in order by sending the necessary and right message to members — that the urge to do substantial justice does not include illegality or the encouragement of the attitude of ‘anything goes’.”
- REFERENCES
- 1. NIGERIAN WEEKLY LAW REPORT
- 2. LAW PAVILLION ELECTORNIC LAW REPORT – PRIMSOL