By Sylvester Udemezue
There is a growing and troubling dissonance between several provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the philosophy of civil liberty and fundamental rights, and Nigeria’s international human rights obligations.
One such troubling provision is section 293(1) ACJA, which provides:
“A suspect arrested for an offence which a Magistrate Court has no jurisdiction to try shall, within a reasonable time of arrest, be brought before a Magistrate Court for remand.”
This provision, and, more importantly, its application in practice, raises grave constitutional, jurisprudential, and moral questions, particularly where a suspect voluntarily honours an invitation by a law-enforcement agency.
SOME CRITICAL QUESTIONS ARISING
(A) VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE VS ARREST
1. Is there truly no legal distinction between a suspect who voluntarily honours an EFCC invitation and a suspect arrested while committing an offence, attempting to escape, resisting arrest, jumping bail, escaping from lawful custody, or posing a reasonable flight or security risk?
2. If such distinctions exist in law, logic, and common sense, why does the ACJA appear to collapse them into one undifferentiated category of “arrested suspects”?
3. How does the EFCC, in law and in practice, distinguish between a person who voluntarily honours its invitation, and a person who is arrested because he refused or failed to honour an invitation?
(B) ADMINISTRATIVE BAIL AND ITS LEGAL MEANING
4. Should a person who voluntarily honours an EFCC invitation ordinarily be detained at all, except in truly exceptional circumstances?
5. If yes, what exactly rendered Mr. Malami’s case “exceptional”?
6. Why did the EFCC grant Mr. Malami administrative bail if there were already sufficient grounds to justify continued detention? (See: “Malami detained for failing to meet bail conditions — EFCC” Punch (13 December 2025); “EFCC: Malami Didn’t Meet Five Bail Conditions Granted Him on November 28” THISDAYLIVE (14 December 2025)).
7. Does the grant of administrative bail not amount to a positive institutional assessment by the EFCC that (i). the suspect is not a flight risk, (ii). will cooperate with investigation, and (iii). can be trusted to remain available?
8. If so, what materially changed between the grant of administrative bail and the subsequent application for a remand order?
(C) REMAND ORDERS, BAIL, AND UNFETTERED DISCRETION
Section 293(2) ACJA provides that an application for remand:
“…shall be made ex parte and shall be verified on oath and contain reasons for the remand request.”
9. Why does the Act fail to define or limit the acceptable reasons upon which a remand request may be made?
10. Can a remand order lawfully be sought on any ground whatsoever, or must such grounds meet constitutional and judicially recognised thresholds?
11. Is it reasonable, or constitutionally defensible, to seek a remand order to continue detaining a person who voluntarily honoured an invitation and had already been granted administrative bail?
(D) SECTION 295 ACJA AND THE COURT’S POWER TO CONSIDER BAIL DURING REMAND HEARING
Section 295 ACJA expressly empowers a court hearing an application for remand to grant bail. It provides:
“The court may, in considering an application for remand brought under section 293 of this Act, grant bail to the suspect brought before it, taking into consideration the provisions of sections 158 to 188 of this Act relating to bail.”
12. Given this express statutory mandate, why did the court seized of the remand application in Mr. Malami’s case fail to consider or exercise its power to grant judicial bail pending completion of investigation?
13. Was the court justified in authorising remand without first interrogating whether bail (on appropriate and enforceable judicial conditions) would sufficiently meet the ends of justice?
14. Does the failure to engage section 295 ACJA not reinforce the growing concern that remand proceedings are increasingly treated as a mechanical endorsement of investigative detention, rather than a constitutionally sensitive safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of liberty?
(E) DISCLOSURE, CANDOUR, AND JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
15. In light of Fawehinmi v IGP, was it proper for a court to grant a remand order to continue detaining a citizen who voluntarily honoured an EFCC invitation and had already been granted administrative bail?
16. Did the EFCC fully and candidly disclose to the court, in its ex parte remand application, that it had already granted Mr. Malami administrative bail, the conditions of which he was reportedly yet to meet?
17. If the court had been aware of this fact, would it still have granted an ex parte remand order authorising fourteen additional days of detention, over and above the days already spent in EFCC custody?
18. Why did the court not insist on being addressed on what had changed since the grant of administrative bail?
19. Or are remand orders now granted as a matter of routine, rather than as exceptional judicial measures?
(F) SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 293 ACJA
20. Section 293 applies to suspects who are “arrested.” Was Mr. Malami arrested in law, or did he merely honour an invitation?
21. Is it reasonable for a person who voluntarily honours an invitation to later be treated as an “arrested” person for purposes of remand?
22. If yes, on what legal grounds, and subject to what safeguards?
23. Are remand provisions not primarily meant for suspects arrested under circumstances showing reasonable apprehension of violence or risk of escape, prior escape from lawful custody, or resistance to lawful arrest or similar situations or other reasonable apprehension?
(G) DETENTION PENDING INVESTIGATION: PURPOSE OR PUNISHMENT?
24. What legitimate purpose does detention pending completion of investigation serve where administrative bail has already been granted and bail conditions are in place?
25. Why did the EFCC not simply allow Mr. Malami time to meet his bail conditions?
26. Were the bail conditions imposed by the EFCC not stringent or reasonable enough to secure his availability?
27. If investigations had not been concluded, does that not mean the EFCC was still uncertain whether to charge Mr. Malami, and for what offence?
28. If the EFCC was unsure whether or how to arraign him, why detain him at all, especially given his voluntary cooperation?
(H) ARRAIGNMENT, INVESTIGATION, AND CONTRADICTIONS
One recognised condition for granting a remand order, derived from judicial decisions, is that arraignment is impracticable within 24–48 hours. This requirement flows directly from section 35(4) of the Constitution, which prioritises early arraignment or release. Failure to justify this impracticability vitiates a remand application. Yet, reports indicate that the EFCC had already drafted and filed charges against Mr. Malami. See:
“EFCC files 16 money laundering charges against Malami, son, associate” (The Guardian, 25 December 2025).
29. Does the filing of charges not constitute prima facie evidence that investigation had been concluded?
30. If so, what then justified the continued detention of Mr. Malami?
(I) BROADER SYSTEMIC QUESTIONS
31. Is it not now obvious that many of our criminal justice laws are weak, manipulable, and easily abused by those in authority?
32. Where are certainty, predictability, impregnability, transparency, and accountability in our legal system?
33. Are our courts afraid of the EFCC, or have we, collectively, made a mockery of the independence of the judiciary?
34. And is this not the same EFCC headed by a lawyer?
To be continued.
Respectfully,
Sylvester Udemezue (Udems) udems@therealityministry.ngo
08021365546
28th December 2025.