Petroleum Products Marketing Co. Ltd v. Masters Maritime Ltd- Citation: (2025) LPELR-83147(SC)Courts & Judiciary
In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, 12th December, 2025
Suit No: SC.543/2015
Before their Lordships:
Helen Ogunwumiju – Justice of the Supreme Court
Adamu Jauro – Justice of the Supreme Court
Jummai Sankey – Justice of the Supreme Court
Obande Ogbuinya – Justice of the Supreme Court
Abubakar Umar – Justice of the Supreme Court
Between
Petroleum Products Marketing Company Limited – Appellant(s)
And
Masters Maritime Limited – Respondent(s)Courts & Judiciary
Lead Judgment delivered by Abubakar Sadiq Umar, J.s.c.
Facts
This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division, delivered on February 9, 2005, wherein the learned Justices of the Court unanimously dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on the ground that the claim is statute-barred.
The Appellant sold and supplied bunker fuel oil to the Respondent’s Ships for their operation/maintenance at various seaports amounting to the total sum of US$1,013,678.80. The Respondent failed to make the necessary payment after the deadline given in the Bill of Lading contracts, prompting the Appellant to institute a case for the recovery of the sum due.
Upon being served with the originating processes, the Respondent approached the Appellant for an out-of-Court settlement. The Appellant withdrew the action. Unfortunately, the Respondent reneged on this proposal and failed to pay to the Appellant the money due to it. The Appellant then commenced an action at the High Court of Lagos State.
The Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection challenging the claims of the Appellant on two (2) grounds. First, that the trial Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit being an admiralty matter and secondly, that the trial Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit being an action commenced by an agency of the Federal Government.
After hearing the preliminary objection, the learned trial Judge in his ruling delivered on February 2, 2007, held that the matter is not an admiralty matter, but one involving money had and received. However, he agreed that State High Courts do not have jurisdiction over matters where the administration or management or control of a Federal Government Agency is called to question. Consequently, since this matter involves the administration and management of the Appellant, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. Thus, the trial Court upheld the preliminary objection and struck out the Appellant’s claim.Courts & Judiciary
Dissatisfied with this ruling, the Appellant approached the Court of Appeal for redress. Its argument was that the Petroleum Products Marketing Company Limited (the Appellant) is a body corporate having its own separate identity, and not a Federal Government entity. He contended that the matter is a simple contract and as such, the trial Judge was wrong to have declined jurisdiction.
In response to these arguments, the Respondent submitted that if the claim was one for simple contract, then the suit was statute-barred having been instituted six years from the time the cause of action arose.
Professional & Trade Associations
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal agreed with the Appellant that the claim was in relation to a simple contract, but held that an examination of the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim shows that the action was commenced seven years after the cause of action arose, which is more than the six-year time limit prescribed by Section 7(1) of the Limitation Act, 1966. This meant that the suit was caught up by the Statute of Limitation and was therefore statute-barred.
Still dissatisfied by the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Appellant filed an appeal in the Supreme Court.
Issues for determination
The Court determined the appeal based on a sole issue thus:
Whether the lower Court was right when it held that the Appellant’s claim was statute-barred?
Appellant’s submissionConstitutional Law & Civil Rights
In arguing the issue, the Appellant contended that in order to determine whether an action is statute-barred, the Court must determine when the cause of action arose. The Appellant placed reliance on Egbe v Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 @ 20; (1987) LPELR-1032(SC); Thomas v Olufosoye (1986)1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669; (1986) LPELR-3237(SC). It was further submitted that a cause of action arises from the time the breach that causes an injury occurs. Furthermore, that the Court would consider the date the cause of action arose and also the date the Writ of Summons was taken out in order to determine whether the action is within the limitation period. The Appellant cited the case of Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission, Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 @ 32; (1998) LPELR-1408(SC), to buttress this submission.The Appellant submitted further that a cause of action matures or arises on the date or from the time when a breach of any duty or act occurs which warrants the person thereby injured or the victim who is adversely affected by such a breach, to institute an action in Court in assertion or protection of this legal right that has been breached. He argued that the cause of action arose on November 29, 2000 when the Respondent wrote to the Appellant admitting its indebtedness and stating how it intended to make good and settle the debt.Courts & Judiciary
Thus, that the institution of this suit by the Appellant on September 30, 2005, was within the timeframe of six years provided for by the statute of limitation. The Appellant, therefore, concluded that by the limitation law of Lagos State, its claim was not statute-barred. He relied on NSITFMB v KLIFCO Nig. Ltd (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt. 12 11) 307 @ 329; (2010) LPELR-2006(SC) to submit that where there is an acknowledgement of a debt by a debtor, the right to recover the debt by a Court action is revived.
In conclusion, the Appellant urged this Court to resolve this issue against the Respondent.
Respondent’s submission
In response, the Respondent relied on Section 7 of the Limitation Act of 1966 and the case of Texaco Inc. v Shell P. D.C. N Ltd (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt. 759) 241, 242; (2002) LPELR-3146(SC) to submit that a statute of limitation is one which provides that no Court shall entertain proceedings for the enforcement of certain rights if such proceedings were commenced after the lapse of a definite period of time.Legal
The Respondent further submitted that in determining whether or not an action is statute-barred, the only document which the Court looks at is the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim to figure out when the wrong, which gives the plaintiff a cause of action, was committed. Then, it is compared with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. If the date on the Writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute-barred.
Counsel argued that in the instant case, the facts disclosed in the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim sufficiently disclosed when the cause of action accrued; and a comparison of that date with the date on which the Writ was filed showed that the suit was statute-barred as at the date the action was commenced. The Respondent relied on F.R.I.N. v Gold (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) 5; (2007) LPELR-1287(SC); Aremo v Adekanye (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 579; (2004) LPELR-544(SC) and Ugba v Suswan (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 473; (2012) LPELR-9726(SC).
Resolution of issue(s)Constitutional Law & Civil Rights
In resolving the sole issue, the Court held that the determination of whether the Appellant’s claim was statute-barred depended on identifying when the cause of action accrued, which is established from the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim. The Court defined cause of action as the material facts giving rise to an enforceable right, including the wrongful act and resulting damage. Relying on AG Federation & Ors v Alhaji Atiku Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1; (2007) LPELR-3(SC), Atiba Iyalamu Savings & Loans Ltd. v. Suberu (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1637) 387 at 393; (2018) LPELR-44069(SC), Bello v. A.-G., Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.45) 828; (1986) LPELR-764(SC); Afolayan v. Ogunrinde (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 127) 359; (1990) LPELR-198(SC); Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669; (1986) LPELR-3237(SC); Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 1; (1988) LPELR-182(SC); P.N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd. v. Abere (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 114; (2001) LPELR-2893(SC).
The Court further held that the cause of action in a debt recovery matter ordinarily accrues upon demand and refusal to pay, and that an acknowledgment of the debt made within the limitation period resets the limitation period, pursuant to Section 38 (1) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State. Such acknowledgment must be in writing, addressed to the creditor, signed by the debtor or his agent/legal representative, and unequivocal, although it need not specify the exact amount owed, citing Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board v KLIFCO Nig. Ltd. (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1211) 329; (2010) LPELR-2006(SC), Ajike v. Cardoso (1939) 5 WACA 134; Thadani v. National Bank of Nigeria Ltd. (1972) 1 SC 105; (1972) LPELR-3147(SC).Courts & Judiciary
Therefore, the Court held that where a debt is acknowledged in writing and signed by the debtor before the initial limitation period expires, the right to recover the debt by an action in Court is revived from the date of the new acknowledgment.
Based on the foregoing, the Court held that the relevant acknowledgment occurred on 29th November, 2000, from which the six-year limitation period commenced, rather than February 10, 1998. Since the action was commenced in September 2005, within six years of the acknowledgment, it was not statute-barred. In the circumstances, the Court held that the debt being acknowledged and the action revived on 29/11/2000, the limitation period for recovery of the debt was revived.
Accordingly, the Court found that the lower Court erred in holding the action statute-barred and resolved the issue in favour of the Appellant. The Court further held that since the trial Court failed to make any finding in respect of the claim before it, the Court has no choice but to send the case back for trial on the merit.
Held
Having resolved the lone issue in favour of the Appellant, the Court allowed the appeal. Consequently, the suit was remitted back to the Chief Judge of Lagos State for assignment to another Judge to be tried expeditiously.Legal
Appearances
Abimbola Kayode, Esq. – For Appellant(s)
Pablo Amaran, Esq. – For Respondent(s)
Compiled by LawPavilion