NBA 2024 Elections: ECNBA Responds to Malpractice Allegations by Ikwuazom and Erojikwe

25″ July 2024

Messrs  Chukwuka  Ikwuazom  SAN; Tobenna Erojikwe

Gentlemen,

RE:  REOUEST     FOR    ACCESS    TO    CRITICAL     INFORMATION REGARDING THE  2024 NBA NATIONAL  ELECTIONS

We refer  to  your letters,  namely  that of Mr.  Chukwuka  Ikwuazom, SAN dated 21^st  July 2024 and  received  by email  at 10:24pm   of same  day,  and  the letter  from  Mr. Tobenna  Erojikwe dated 22^nd  July  2024  and  served  by email  at 5:27pm   of same date, both  in the main,  worded  in similar language and containing  similar requests from  the Electoral  Committee  of the Nigerian  Bar Association  (ECNBA)  in respect of the just concluded NBA  2024 Elections. By reason  of the similarity in content and requests,  permit  us to respond jointly  to you both  to avoid  becoming  repetitive in our response,

We  have also taken  into  consideration   various  earlier  publications   by yourselves on social media  addressed  generally  to Members   of our noble association  by which medium you  both   raised   similar   matters   of  complaints concerning  the  just concluded NBA   election,  and  other  pre-election  issues  which  we consider   only appropriate   for us to respond   to herein  for the  purpose   of completeness.    In the circumstance,   kindly  permit  we start  with those  pre-election   issues  Mr. Erojikwe particularly  had raised  in his social media  letters to Members of the Bar.

INTRODUCTION

By  the  provisions   of  Section   I0  (6) of  the NBA  Constitution,   the  election   of National Officers and NBA  representatives   to the General  Council  of the Bar shall be by universal  suffrage and  electronic  voting as set out in  the second  schedule   to the Constitution. It was in furtherance of this the 2024 NBA Elections were held on 20th July 2024 on the “ElectionBuddy” electronic voter platform and final results announced on Sunday 21st July 2024 within 11 hours of completion of voting, in accordance with our Constitution. Election Buddy Inc, Owners and Operators of the voting platform had formally issued ECNBA a certification of the results of the election on 21st  July 2024 at about 12:57 am WAT, duly signed off by its President and  Chief  Executive,  Dave Bodnarchuk  (See  annexure). In  addition  to  the validation of the election outcomes by the certification of Election Buddy Inc at completion, and upon receipt of your respective complaints referred to  above, we have in consultation with the Election Service Provider (Election Buddy Inc/Inits Consortium) and the Technical Service Consultant (DigiterHub Ltd) sought to provide answers to your respective requests where possible, in the hope that the answers  we  now  exhaustively provide  below  will clear  any  misconceptions, ambiguities or misinformation you may have or have circulated concerning the NBA 2024 elections.

It  should  be noted  that the  Election Voting Platform (Election Buddy) is an international  company  based  in  Edmonton,  Canada  and  has  conducted  over 300,000 elections  globally for  organizations like the  NBA, Multinational Corporations  holding General Meetings across continents, party primaries and national  elections  of Nations around  the  world.  Election Buddy  consortium therefore has no affiliation of any sort with the Nigerian  Bar Association nor any candidate other than as a service provider to ECNBA for this election.

BACKGROUND

Over the several months of preparation for the elections of 20^th July 2024, ECNBA issued about 17 Notices on various aspects of the electoral process, besides our published Request For Proposals, list of shortlisted bidders for services, announcements, were,  all issued in compliance with the provisions of the NBA Constitution and extant Laws of the land  as provided in Part II, Article 7, 2nd  Schedule of the Constitution, which requires that the ECNBA shall demonstrate respect for the rule of law and comply with the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Summary  of Compliance   Steps

i. Notice of election  was issued in Notice No 2 on  1^st March  2024 and further directions in Notice 2A of 5^th March 2024 in compliance with Part VII, Article 1, 2^nd Schedule of the Constitution.

ii. Nominations  opened  on  11^th March  2024  and  ECNBA’s  first set  of Guidelines on the conduct of the elections were issued and published in our Notice 3  (Guideline A) of 11^th March 2024 on the elections, made pursuant to Part ,1, Article 2 of the NBA Constitution (ahead of the 60 days deadline to election day), with additional Guidelines (B & C) following in ECNBA  Notices 9 and 11,   as the electoral process progressed into its various stages.

iii. Selection of service providers including the Technical Service Consultant and Electronic Voting Platform Providers was transparentlv conducted by ECNBA issuing Requests  for  Proposals,  receiving bids,  transparent  opening  of  bids, publication of shortlisted bidders, conduct of technical and financial reviews before the final selection of the Service  Providers, and their names  announced  in the Notices.

iv. Final list of Candidates was published and circulated ahead of deadline in line with our Constitution, upon conclusion of screening and  the appeal process.

v. The  Voters’  List  was published  on the  28″  of May 2024 ahead of the Constitutional deadline of 45 days to election  day, and announced in our Notice No.8  issued  on the same date. Whereas Mr. Tobenna Erojikwe had continued to erroneously claim in publications on social media  that the Voters’ list was not published, the electronic trail of our notices on the www.ecnba.org website shows clearly this claim is misconceived. Perhaps the misconception was from a lack of appreciation of the need to publish the Voters’ list in the secured format we did, which allowed only eligible voters to check and view their names,  details and personal data on the Voters list, but without the pleasure of viewing other voters’ personal data. The critical  security information for the elections were the voter’s SCN number, phone number, and email address, which constitute personal data protected under the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023, and which a custodian of such data (as ECNBA  is) should not unlawfully publish, particularly without the consent of the data subject. See generally sections 24 to 40, and 65 of the Act.  It was however important for the credibility of the elections that the Voters’ list to be published, should  of necessity show these critical details to enable  each voter to verify the  correctness of their personal  data through which means  they would ultimately receive their  voting credentials to participate in the elections and cast their vote for the candidates of their choice. These  personal data are the core information with which each voter would vote on election day, and thus critical to be published  on the Voters’  list,  yet without our breaching  statutory provisions  that may render  the ECNBA/NBA  liable  for regulatory  infringement,  besides  liability exposure   to individual  members whose  personal data would  have been  unlawfully published.  It should  be noted  that we now live in an age where many members who bank electronically with digital banks, have their phone numbers  serving as their bank  account  numbers, and  in an  age of bank  hacking,  exposing  members’ personal data (email, phone number,  SCN) may render  them vulnerable in many unintended ways. It was in deference to the provisions of the Data Privacy Act, that ECNBA felt mandatorily obliged by statute to protect these critical members’ data in our custody lest it became unduly exposed or render our members vulnerable to identity theft by that exposure. Indeed, Part 2, Article 7 of the NBA Constitution requires our compliance with National laws,

In view of this, and in line with the Data Privacy Act, we employed the use of appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure  confidentialitv, integrity and availability of the personal data, in publishing the Voters’ list for the purpose  of meeting our constitutional obligations under  the NBA  Constitution. This informed the unique manner in which the Voters’ list was published on our website which met the requirements of both the Data Privacy Act and the NBA Constitution. It allows  members to  check  their  eligibility, and  confirm  their personal details to receive their voting codes  by personally inserting their unique SCN to search for their names on the list, yet prevents unauthorized persons from accessing their personal details without their consent. We owe that statutory duty to you as candidates, to all our members and the NBA. We were therefore never in breach of our Constitution on  publication of Voters’ list as you alleged sirs.

vi. The   outcome  of  our initial verification exercise  of  the  Voters’  list by members and  further filtration conducted  by  the  ECNBA   and  our service providers were discussed and presented to yourselves and other candidates at the stakeholders’ meeting of 10th June  2024, with resolutions taken presented to NEC and ratified, and further at a second stakeholders’ meeting with candidates on 12^th July  2024.  It  should be  emphasized  that  every step, decision, and  procedure adopted by ECNBA in the electoral process were either announced and published in our Notices to all members, circulated on various channels, and/or presented at the  stakeholders’ meetings with candidates. As  far  back  as  our  stakeholders’ meeting and press conference of 10^th June 2024, yourselves and other candidates were given all the facts and figures behind the Voters’ list including the total number of eligible voters (72,071), data correction requests submitted at verification, our adopted policies for processing  the  submissions  transparently, our  filtration outcomes, observations  on  the  voters’  list,  etc,  thereby demonstrating utmost transparency to you and co-candidates at every stage of the process.

vii. Prior to, and at the stakeholders’  meeting of 12″ July 2024, Mr Tobenna Erojikwe had again requested that the already published voters’ list be re-published with full  details to which we restated our  above position, further  to which you requested  we re-publish in a  different  format  showing members’ names and branches, and although you left that meeting early, it was the consensus of all other candidates  present   at  the  stakeholders’ meeting  that your  request was  an unnecessary exercise. That resolution was expressly communicated to you by other candidates  and  by the  ECNBA  Chairman after the  meeting. Nevertheless, the ECNBA in our consistent responsiveness and transparency decided to still publish a Branch  Voters’ Directory on our  website showing in alphabetical order, the names and branches of all eligible voters (but without their critical personal data). This format was not, and could not have been a valid Voters’ list (if that was all we published) as its content  falls short of the  essential features a valid Members’ Voters’  list for  an electronic  voting election  should  contain  (i.e. SCN, Phone number,  email), which details we had  earlier published  in the  Voters’  list and database released on 28th May 2024 and visible to every eligible voter. Please note that both the Voters’ list and the Branch Voters’ directory are still on the ECNBA website till date and will remain until the post-election reviews and audit processes are finalized and submitted to the National Executive Council {NEC).

It is therefore misinformation  by any candidate  to continue to   suggest on social media that the voters’ list was not published until hours to  the commencement of the  election when  yourselves and  all candidates  are  aware of the  Voters’ list publication since 28th May 2024 when members were invited to verify their personal details in preparation for election as intended by our constitution.

ALLEGED ELECTION DAY ANOMALIES STATED BY YOURSELVES

May we quickly state that ECNBA   is by its mandate conducting a full post-election audit of its election processes, operations and execution with a view to providing a final post-election report in the coming weeks to be submitted to the NBA NEC.

This, we are doing along with our Service Providers and may take a few weeks to complete.However, your complaints and requests necessitated an urgent response to same even though our post-election audit is still ongoing, hence this preliminary report to you and the production of some of the relevant documents you requested, on which further drill down procedures are still ongoing, all in a bid to assist you to better appreciate the processes and  systems adopted  for the election,  answer your· questions and clarify your assumptions.

1. Alleged IdentityTheft/Double voting:

We implemented a robust system to prevent double-voting in the election process using Election Buddy. Each voter receives a unique voting link, which is securely generated and distributed individually.

This unique link is dispatched by email and SMS to eligible voters via the email and phone number attached to their profile on the list of eligible voters. They are also required to provide their SCN to unlock their own ballot on that link. Once a vote  is cast using this unique link, it becomes inactive and cannot be used again, thereby  preventing duplicate votes. This method  guarantees the integrity of the election by ensuring that each voter can only vote once, maintaining a fair and transparent voting process.

While  we  are  confident  in  the  process  and  system  design deployed,  which inherently  prevents  double-voting or  identity theft,  we  take  your claims very seriously. In our pre-election  engagements, we provided  ample information  of discoveries of various kind in the clean up of the Voters’ list. One of such which we discussed with you and other candidates was that many members at the time they paid their Bar Practice Fees in January-March, had this done  for them by proxy (by their staff, juniors,  Assistants, etc). Those  proxies in most cases while registering the payment in the name of their lawyer seniors/friends being assisted, inserted  their  own phone number and/or  email  by  default  (not  necessarily maliciously). Those data entries if not amended remains their contact details to receive voting credentials and such recipients of it may then have access to your ballot. ECNBA gave such members the opportunity to correct such default derails during the verification  period between 28th March  and 7th June  2024.  Therefore, members who failed to avail themselves of the opportunity cannot hold ECNBA liable if their voter links became compromised by their default. That was not an ECNBA issue but that of the voter who had compromised his personal data to a proxy at the point of entry of payment of your BPF, and failed to correct same during voter verification exercise when we published the Voters’ register.

Other than these, should you have any valid claims of such identity theft,we require and request detailed information about the specific cases to interrogate each case as it may be a professional  misconduct  for any lawyer to use another’s  voting credentials to cast a vote on behalf of the authentic voter. Please provide  us the SCN numbers of your said supporters you claim suffered such or experienced this issue so we can investigate the associated voter links sent to their profile on the Voters’ list, identify the exact ballot cast via that link and any related activity, and we shall publish our findings accordingly. Rather than make a sweeping statement of identity  theft without  particulars,  you can assist  us to show you the truth  about each  case if you provide us the details of your complaining supporters

Additionally,the  voting platform secures from voting manipulation by providing a unique confirmation code to a voter after the ballot is cast, and also emailed to each voter. This confirmation code represents their entire ballot, protecting their choices and ensuring it is impossible to alter their voting records bv double voting. If you oblige us the details requested, we have an electronic footprint to use to show who voted using the sent voter link, and if we additionally have written consent from those supporters of yours so complaining, we can also unveil their said privately cast votes for transparency in our investigation.

2. Discrepancies in Vote Display and Updates

To achieve a better viewing experience and at the same time discourage multiple and  aggressive refreshing of the  results page,  the  results  display page had  an automatic refresh feature so the voter only needed  to have the page open in their browser,on their phone, or computer.The refresh is confirmed to happen within one and two minutes after the page is loaded. This is also done to match the results tallying process which happens as votes are being cast. The compilation of results after a vote is cast takes a few seconds or up to a few minutes, depending on how many votes have already been cast and how many have just been cast. The results page would therefore not change until the compilation is completed.

Additionally, it is important to note that the snapshotview at every refreshed minute displays votes already sorted into each candidate’s tally. Votes still being sorted upon being cast may not have reflected immediatelv until the system completes sorting and adds  them  to each  candidate’s  pile. Some  people, however, were refreshing the page every few seconds, hoping to see updated results before the results  page had  the updated  information, ignoring this recommended refresh period. There was therefore no malicious intent of any sort either in the periodic display nor in the final tally. (See the Annexure D -final results certified by Election Buddy, also posted on www.ecnba.org)

3. Suspicious Vote Increase Pattern:

The number of votes attributed to all candidates is an exact reflection of the ballots cast by participants over the course of the election period.

Your  claim of a steady increase  pattern  without specifying your assumed  or calculated ratio of the so-called “steady increase” makes such a claim empty and without foundation. However, to provide you some clarity, we have attached the hourly table of votes cast  (See Annexure A).  This table aptly demonstrates that the votes  cast each hour by all voters do not follow any steadv pattern nor even increase, thus disproving your claim of a pre-programmed  voting pattern or vote allocation. Any vote increase pattern  observed is  a natural result of member  participation throughout the election period. You had both further  alleged in your letters and comments on social media that you observed a “steady increase” of the votes of the winning candidate was in an “almost exact geometric progression at the top of the hour” concluding  howbeit erroneously, that  same  was   pre-programmed.  The attached table of hourly capture of votes  cast shows there are hourly bands with votes  in excess of 3000/2000  votes, just as there several hourly bands with total votes cast far less  than  1000  votes,  The question is which of these hourly bands reflect the alleged “exact geometric progression”? It is important  to note that at commencement of the election, Mr Ikuwazom, SAN was in 2^nd place in the votes cast at least in  the  early hours  until later when  the  vote  tally of Mr. Erojikwe increased and pushed him to 2^nd  place with Mr Ikuwazorn SAN dropping to 3^rd . It is therefore incorrect  to allege as  Ikuwazorn and his supporters suggested in social media posts that he was placed third all through the election, nor was there an exactitude attributable to votes progression of any candidate.

ECNBA and our Service Providers were and remain committed to maintaining the integrity  of the  election process  and  ensuring that  every vote  cast is accurately reflected in the final results. To put out an allegation of pre-programming of voting results without any fact of such is to  maliciously deprecate the reputation of the international companies and Service Providers employed by ECNBA, and indeed of members  of the  ECNBA as being co-conspirators  in pre-programming vote patterns, yet offering no shred of fact in justification. We continue to urge restraint in our  use of words to express our dissatisfaction, so as to avoid a misinformation of members and the public, or denigrating reputations of men and/or institutions built over several decades.

4. Discrepancies in Vote Patterns

It was alleged by Mr. lkwuazom SAN that “reported  voting figures show inconsistencies with the actual votes cast” by his supporters,  therefore  suggesting manipulation of the system. It is important to clarify that the choices made by voters in their ballots are private and confidential. It is not possible for any contestant to know with certainty how individual voters or indeed his said supporters have cast their votes. Did the 40,656 voters who participated (of which 9,018  voters cast their ballots for Mr Ikuwazom) show you their e-ballots to know who they really voted for? Actual votes cast by any candidate’s  supporters are. only known  to each voter. Extrapolating from assurances given you by supporters,  to match against actual reported voting figures tallied, offers no scientific basis of arriving at your conclusions   sirs. While   we cannot   imagine the  possibility of  this  claim  in  any scenario, 1, we  are open  to understanding  how  you gained  access to the  actual votes cast by the said supporters as that  remains  the onlv way to  conclusively assert vour expected  voting pattern  against the actual votes cast, especially in an  electronic voting system. We find no basis for this assertion sirs.

5. That  the  number  of  votes  ascribed  to  the  winning  candidate steadily increased in an almost exact geometric progression  at the top of each hour  for nearly  the  entirety  of  the  election  in  a  manner  is  demonstrative of  a  pre programming of votes:

In  addition  to answers in paragraph  3 above, note  that  the  number  of votes attributed to  all  candidates  is  an  exact reflection  of  the  ballots  cast  by the participants over the course of the election period. A claim of a steady increase pattern without specifying the  ratio of such a “steady  increase’  is baseless.  To provide clarity, we  have  attached  an  hourly  table  of  votes  cast.  This  table demonstrates that the votes cast each hour by all voters do not follow a steady or even increase, thus disproving the claim of a pre-programmed vote allocation. The vote  increase  pattern  observed  is  a  natural  result  of  member  participation throughout the election period.

6. That  the number  of votes cast for candidates at different positions during the course of the election did not tally.

For interim results (while the election is ongoing), the platform processed votes in a sequential manner,  reviewing each position and question independently before moving on to the next one. Each set of results is stored separately as it compiles the subsequent ones.  Given there were 13 positions being vied for (10 National offices and 3 General Council of the Bar Bloc Regional slots), a vote can be included in the results for a subsequent compilation, depending on when it was cast during the ongoing compilation process.

This sequential processing can lead to temporary disparities in the. totals displayed at intervals for different positions, while minute by minute snapshots were being viewed  as the system tallied votes.  For example, results presented  at 8AM may show wider disparities compared to those at 4 AM due to a higher volume of votes being cast and processed at that time. Additionally, as the number  of ballots cast increases, the time required for compilation also increases. Consequently, results at 4 PM may take a bit longer to compile than those at 4 AM, providing more opportunity for votes to be cast during the compilation process of each position.

This  is why the  ECNBA   labelled  these  interim  views of results  using  the phrase “Vote  Count”  and also  included  a time stamp  in the results so it is dear  this is an interim result view. At the end of the voting period, the final official results were compiled  for  the last time and  consistency was confirmed  across all categories leading to the final results.

7. That while the actual voting took place on the platform provided by Election Buddy  i.e. electionbuddy.com,  the  live election  results  were  exhibited  on  a completely different  and  unrelated  platform, go.ecnba.org.  Technical  experts engaged by me find this rather curious and strange, and it questions the integrity of the results.  As a technical matter, it leads to irresistible inference that the results purportedly projected on the ecnba.org platform as live results of the election were simulated results that may,likely,be different from those at the backend servers of Election Buddy:

The full certification of results by Election Buddy and delivered to the ECNBA immediately after the election negates this allegation. This certification is based on all the information available on the backend  servers of Election Buddy and the information displayed on go.ecnba.org  is consistent with the certification of results. The  complete voting information  has been  securely provided  to the  ECNBA. Below is additional technical information  on  the  process  and  thinking for the viewing portal go.ecnba.org.

From the  original 72,071 eligible voters on  the Voters list, 72,059 voters were uploaded on the voter platform as eligible (less 12 blanked out voters with strange SCN numbers starting with EXM ……  which were invalidated by the Supreme Court enrolment office, and which fact had been earlier presented to stakeholders on 12^th July 2024) to participate in the 2024 NBA elections.  The platform where. the votes were cast must therefore have had more than enough capacity for this number of voters.  Based  on past  NBA  election  experience, we found the  viewership of election results extends beyond the eligible voters. Concerned  citizens, observers, Non-Eligible/Non-Voting lawyers, Non-lawyers and curious individuals within and outside  Nigeria, and many others  follow the results. This  means  that while the system  for elections   is designed to sufficiently handle  the  expected number  of voters {72,059), the results display page must be able to handle much more traffic than the voter traffic without freezing nor  downtime.  This  was one  of the key lessons learnt from the previous online NBA elections  held by past ECNBA. As a matter of fact, in one of such past NBA elections, there were over 3.7 million hits on the election results page alone from all over the world!

It was therefore imperative to ensure:

• That the voting process,  result  compilation,  and  experience  by voters  were not affected by the traffic to the result viewing site.
• Detailed  snapshots   of the  results  are  periodically taken  and  presented  on go.ecnba.org  on   a  public   URL  that   anyone   can   visit   easily  and   see conveniently.
• That we had a system architecture design that would  support this separation of processes.  A good  solution  architect  knows  how critical this is.
• That  the infrastructure  is optimized  based  on its primary  function.
• That we had  the right rules  in place to  repel  all cyber  threats  we could  be subjected  to.
• Well-architected designs follow a similar pattern.

 At a point  in time, the results  viewing page started receiving a massive flood  of hits, matching  the  characteristics of a Denial  of Service.  (DoS)  attack.  Details  of these will be in the final post-election   report.

In the digital world, a DoS attack happens  when  a hacker  attempts  to  overwhelm  a website  or online service with an excessive amount  of traffic or requests, with the intention  of making  it unable  to function  properly  and preventing legitimate  users from  accessing  it. If successful,  such  a disruption   can  cause  inconvenience and damage  to the reputation  of the affected service.  This  means a successful  Denial  of Service would have blocked  access to the results viewing page and raised  concerns with everyone. However, we had already prepared for the possibility  that someone or a group of persons may attempt  to do this and we were able to handle  and ensure the results  viewing page  remained  available by reason   of the  system  architecture. solution  employed.

Regarding  the specific concern  about  voting on Election  Buddy  and vewing results on go.ecnba.org:

• Single Election Platform:  There was only one  election  platform  for voting, which was Election  Buddy.  All votes were cast on this secure platform.

• Results Display and Information Hub:The go.ecnba.org  platform  was used exclusively  to display  the  results of the  elections  and  provide  valuable  pre election  information and instructional  guides for public consumption.  There was no  separate  platform  for  voting for  the  elections.   The  voting  platform for the NBA 2024 Election was provided  and run by ElectionBuddy. Only ElectionBuddy.com was used   for  voting.  The  go.ecnba.org  portal  was merely  a viewing  portal  (It is like  a viewing  screen  in an overflow  canopy outside  an event center, to provide  a view of the event happening in the event hall. Offering that view outside  the hall controls viewing traffic from flooding the main event hall where  the main  event  is happening yet watching  same event  in the hall. It can also be likened to our watching on a television set at home a live soccer match in a stadium. Whereas you may not be inside the stadium, you are watching the same match being played in the stadium on your TV set at home, and not a different match. The go.ecnba.org page was not a voting platform and any ICT expert worth his claim can go on the said portal and verify to  see it was never a voting site but a viewing portal only.
• Familiar Platform:The go.ecnba.org website had been widely circulated by the ECNBA through various channels, including videos,  broadcasts, sensitization meetings across regions, and notices, ensuring that voters were already  familiar with it. It is contained  in  the  animated  videos  widely circulated pre-election and announced as the result viewingplatform ahead of elections.
• Post-Vote Confirmation: After a voter casts their vote, the confirmation message  includes  a  link  to see  the  results  on  go.ecnba.org, providing seamless navigation from voting to result viewing,
• Secure Connection: The go.ecnba.org was securely connected to the results page and was projecting that information throughout the election period, ensuring accuracy and integrity.
• Traffic Management: By directing the significant traffic to the result viewing page, we were able to protect the voting pages from potential overload, ensuring a smooth voting experiencefor all eligible voters. We  thus avoided the negative experiences of past elections.

8. Some Voters reported receiving emails acknowledging that their votes had been submitted even before they had the opportunity to cast their votes. Others reported  subsequently receiving another link to cast their votes. In other words, these were demonstrable instances of double-voting or at least data manipulation.

 We implemented a robust system to prevent double-voting in the election process using Ele.ctionBuddy.  Each voter receives a unique  voting link, which is securely generated and distributed individuallv. This unique link is dispatched by Email and  SMS to Eligible Voters  via the  Email  and  Phone   Number   attached   to  their profile on the list of eligible voters.

The voter would also need to provide their unique SCN to unlock their own ballot on that link. Once a vote is cast using this unique  link, it becomes inactive and cannot be used again, thereby preventing duplicate votes. This method guarantees the  integrity of the election  by ensuring  that  each  voter  can  only vote once, maintaining a fair and transparent voting process. While we do not see the svstern design allowing the possibility of this complaint raised, we would like to explore the validity of this claim by requesting for a pool of the SCN numbers of persons you claim experienced this challenge.  Without this it would be mere speculation for anyone to make such a claim without proof. Note if a person claims his vote had been  submitted without him  participating, he  must have received an acknowledgment  of such  submission. If he claims he later upon  complaining, received a second link, did he vote with the said second link. If he claims he did, then  he must have received a second acknowledgment of vote code,  which we would find incredibly impracticable given our system security. The  platform also secures from voting manipulation  by providing a unique confirmation code to a voter after the ballot is cast, and emailed to them.  It is a representation of their entire ballot for the purpose of protecting their choices. It would be impossible to change  their voting records  on  any basis, hence  making double  voting in this election almost impossible and unbelievable.

Nevertheless, if you can send us the SCNs of such complainants, we will definitely offer you more detailed facts related to such a case beyond what you may have been told.

9. Despite the fact that the election was widely advertised to commence by 12:00am and end by 11  :59 pm on Saturday 20 July2024, voting continued into the early hours of Sunday 21 July 2024 and the number of votes continued to increase.

The compilation of results were completed at past midnight when the voting closed. The final compilation of results is an intensive process because it includes a ballot by ballot check,vote by vote verification and integrity check. It also includes a check for any tampering. All the voting data is tamper evident, making it very difficult to manipulate the results of the election. This is one of the most powerful features of the voting platform provided by ElectionBuddy.

However,due to a surge towards the  final minutes of the voting period, it meant it was critical to wait and fully complete this check when voting closed. This as expected  resulted in  the  number  of votes  changing  as the  final compilation  was taking place. A total of 23 votes dropped after midnight and processed. At close of polls, It was transparently made clear on the result display screen that the final compilation was taking place and it was also made clear when the final compilation was completed. As seen in the ElectionBuddy certified results annexed, the final results issued out at 12.57am  West  African Time.

REQUESTS  BY COMPLAINANTS

We have escalated your respective requests  for  access and  information  to the electronic voting service  provider  (E-Buddy), and while the  post-election audit process is still on, we are only able to make the following responses,  and documents annexed available to you, in addition to the given explanations above and below. Where requested documents  are unavailable, the reason for such are also clearly stated. We therefore have copied below the responses  from the Service Provider:

a. Request for full access to server and application log files used during the election period.

The log information  would  contain information  that is not  specific to  ECNBA votes. Access to these logs would expose other user’s  sensitive information and would constitute  a  breach   of  data. This  is  contrary  to the GDPR, and NDPA\NDPR compliance  regulations. As you are  aware, Election Buddy  Inc provides  its services to tons of organizations  and nations globally using the same servers and application files, hence giving one user access clearly compromises the entire credibility of their servers carrying other users’ data. It is like a bank. customer demanding access to the bank’s server because of an alleged entry in his statement of account, whereas the same server holds thousands of other customers’ financial and   personal   data. Your  request will    render Election Buddy Inc liable professionally and  contractually  to  other users of   their platform,  ence unacceptable.

b. Access to the election systems architecture documentation.

This was provided  to the Electoral Committee  of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA) at the bidding stage and a copy will be provided with this response (See Annexure C).

c. Complete     database    records,    including    voter    information     and   voting transactions.

Voter  information   concerning voters cannot  be provided  as this is a direct violation of the privacy of their ballot choices and infringes the Data Privacy Act. Except  you provide us with the consent  letters of the voters whose  voting transaction  data you seek, we cannot  ex-pose to  you such private  data of voters choices.

d. Network  traffic logs from  the election  

The  network traffic logs requested  encompass much  more information   than just data pertaining to this NBA election,  as Election  Buddy  system supports  multiple clients simultaneously, Sharing  these logs would risk exposing  sensitive. information unrelated   to the NBA  vote,  compromising   the privacy and security  of others.

To  address  the integrity and transparency of the election  process,  a certification  of results   letter   signed   by  the   President  of  Election   Buddy,   a  Certified   Public Accountant (CPA),  Dave  Bodnarchuk,  was provided.  This  certification,  attached here,  attests to the fairness  and accuracy  of the election,  ensuring  that only eligible voters  as represented  on the Voters list participated,   each voter  only voted once, and  all votes  were securely  processed and  recorded.  Based  on  the  independent review  and  the  stringent  criteria   applied,   we  are  confident   in. the  integrity  and security of the election  process.  The  attached  certification letter  (Annexture  D) and final   results   provide   detailed    attestation    to  the   credibility   of   the   election.

 We trust this  certification   letter,  along  with  the  detailed   procedures    it  outlines, address  your concerns  regarding  the election’s  transparency   and accuracy.

e. All incident response  documentation    or reports from  the election  cycle.

No  incidents  to report. The  ECNBA  will receive  a detailed   post-election   audit report from Election   Buddy/INlTl’S  Consortium   as captured in the terms  for the purposes   of documenting  all activities,  lessons  and recommendations.

f. Details of security measures and protocols implemented for the election

• Secure  software development life-cycle implementation
• SSL,TLS transport  security
• Data validation  and sanitization,  Database  Boundarv validations  before  data persisted
• Database  encryption
• Content  distribution   networks integration to prevent DDOS
• Web application  firewall
• Black Box/white Box penetration   tests

g. Detailed    logs   of    all   voter    authentication      attempts,     successful    and unsuccessful,   to investigate  the reported identity  theft issues.

The  information you request is considered   sensitive and private.  These logs contain data  that  can  potentially   correlate  with  the  ballot  choices   made   by voters,  thus compromising  their anonymity  and violating the principle  of the confidential  voting process   promised.   Protecting    the  identity   and  privacy  of  voters   is  of  utmost importance,    hence   sharing   these   detailed   information,  even   for  investigative purposes, that may be copied  and further  shared  to your team, could inadvertently ex-pose voter identities  and private  information,   which we must avoid,  to maintain the integrity of the electoral  process.

Nevertheless,  to assist your inquiry,  if you still require it, we may be able to arrange a joint sit-down review of the logs with our Service  Provider,at which meeting you may explore and ask questions on it. We are however unable to provide you a copy of confidential data that may expose voter choices.

h. A complete record of voting timestamps for all cast ballots to analyse voting patterns and potential anomalies.

This is only provided here on an hourly basis to preserve the identity of the voters. Attached as Annexure “A” to this response is the related information.

i.Documentation of any changes or updates made to the voting system before, during,or immediatelyafter the election period.

No changes were made. Penetration Testing results were shared with the ECNBA regarding the security posture of the platform before the elections and no modifications  to the  architecture  or  components were carried  out  during  and immediately after the election.

j. Records of all individuals who had administrative access to the voting system during the election period.

For security and privacy reasons, we are unable to disclose specific details about administrative access beyond that this was highly limited and an admin audit shows no changes were made or votingcredentials revealed or accessed throughoutthe election. Limited administrativeaccess was granted within Election Budd/NITS consortium only,  following  stringent security protocols and  was monitored  to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the election process.

k,   Copies  of all data  backups  taken  before,  during,  and  after the  election process.

The backup containsproprietary,and other clients data as ElectionBuddy provides services to other clients.  The  backup consists of other clients data and therefore could not be shared due to confidentialityand  contractualclauses.

l. All documentation of APIs and their usage logs.

APIs are proprietary and for use in the elections onlv.

m. Detailed logs of any system errors, including timeouts and database update freezes.

The platformwas over provisioned for compute, storage and database. Therefore, we did not have any update or system/database freezes during the election.

n. All formal records of voter complaints or reported issues during the election.

This has been categorized and a summarv will be shared along with this response (See Anne.xure B).

o. Data on  system performance   throughout  the  election  period,  including server response times and load

Prior   to   and   during   the   election   period,   comprehensive  data   on   system performance was collected, including server response times and load statistics. The ECNBA had requested thorough load testing to ensure system robustness. As part of these preparations, server configurations were optimized to handle a peak load of 75 votes per second.

Throughout the voting process, the system performed efficiently, with server usage metrics  indicating  that  the  infrastructure  was  well within  operational  limits. Specifically, the maximum server usage recorded was about 20% for the database servers and  14%  for the  application servers,   This  indicates that the  system was operatingwith significantheadroom,ensuringsmooth and responsiveperformance even at peak times.

Additionally, server response times remained consistently low, ensuring a seamless voting  experience for  users,   Load   statistics  showed  that   the  system  could comfortably handle the voting traffic, with no significant latency or downtime.

These metrics highlight the effectiveness  of the load testing and server tuning efforts undertaken   prior  to the election,  ensuring  a reliable  and efficient voting process.

p. Detailed logs of all PNG image  uploads to the ecnba.org/results/ portal, including timestamps, file sizes, and the account or process responsible for these uploads.

The PNGs were snapshots of the tallies of ballots that were cast and saved at that point  in  time  and  were automatically updated.  The  latest P’.\’G replaced the previous one to ensure any visits to the results viewing page would always return the latest snapshot of the results. The  PNGs had an average size of 283KB.  Only the latest and final PNG taken at the end is available. This is available as Annexure E.

q.Documentation on the process and protocolsused to transfer data from the primary election platform  (electionbuddy.com) to the display portal (go.ecnba.org).

There  was no transfer of data from the primary election platform to the display portal.  The  go.ecnba.org  portal  was merely  a  presentation  laver  to what was available from the ElectionBuddy results page.

r. All third-party service logs and reports from these services.

Logs for third party services like CDN providers cannot be provided as multiple customers use the sen ice and reports will contain information for unrelated users.

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS BY ECNBA

It has been a grueling and tasking assignment organizing a seamless Bar elections in 2024 given our  past experiences.  Viie left no stone· unturned,  anticipating all probabilities and challenges and remedying same ahead of the elections.  The above responses and explanations clearly show the interest of ECNBA and om Sen ice. Providers were clearly to ensure a credible and transparent process and election, and as much as possible avoid past system challenges and attendant controversies. This is evident in our multiple messaging, notices, engagements with stakeholders, etc. vVe sourced for and  deployed upscaled technology, redesigned a fail-proof system structure,  all in a bid to assure our candidates and voters of a very credible election and process, and provide a satisfactory voter experience.  Voterswho called our  helplines had their issues either satisfactorilv sorted, explained, resolved or politely declined where the demand was beyond EC~BA mandate or incapable of being addressed. Our final reports will contain re.commendations from ECNBA and  our  Service Providers,  of ways and  steps to  even make the  process  more seamless beyond the success of the 2024 elections.

While we appreciateyour disappointment at the Joss of an election, we do not think every loss should be attributed to mischief and unwholesome practices as alleged by  your  complaints.   ECNBA members   and  our  Service  Providers  at commencement were required to sign up to undertakings warranting no conflict of interest in respect of our assigned tasks, all in a bid to ensure full commitment of all, even at the  risk of actionable legal steps against such, where any conflict of interest issue arises against any member or provider. Besides, we can attest to  the credibility and  authenticity  of  the  voting  process  and  re.suits as  me.e.ting  a significantly substantial compliance  test measured  on all parameters. ViTe would expect that where candidates  do not quite understand  an employed  process or system, a  simple  question  to ECNBA, rather  than  published  accusations and allegations would provide valuable answers to  clarify. The  ECNBA, Candidates and  NBA  Members  are Partners  in progress  for the purpose  of our  common objective of electing officers.

We do hope the above preliminary response provides you both valuable insights and answers to your contestations and requests. Should you have further need for more information, you may provide us specific details of instances of any infraction with traceable data of persons  affected and we shall interrogate and provide you further answers, otherwise we advise that you kindly await our final post-election report and audit in the next few weeks, for an even more detailed information.

Thank you and accept. our sincere  regards. Yours  faithfully,

Dated  this 25″ July 2024