Suspicious Vote Increase Pattern:<\/em><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\nThe number of votes attributed to all candidates is an exact reflection of the ballots cast by participants over the course of the election period.<\/p>\n
Your \u00a0claim of a steady increase \u00a0pattern \u00a0without specifying your assumed \u00a0or calculated ratio of the so-called “steady increase” makes such a claim empty and without foundation. However, to provide you some clarity, we have attached the hourly table of votes cast \u00a0(See Annexure A). \u00a0This table aptly demonstrates that the votes \u00a0cast each hour by all voters do not follow any steadv pattern nor even increase, thus disproving your claim of a pre-programmed \u00a0voting pattern or vote allocation. Any vote increase pattern \u00a0observed is \u00a0a natural result of member \u00a0participation throughout the election period. You had both further \u00a0alleged in your letters and comments on social media that you observed a “steady increase” of the votes of the winning candidate was in an “almost exact geometric progression at the top of the hour” concluding \u00a0howbeit erroneously, that \u00a0same \u00a0was\u00a0 \u00a0pre-programmed.\u00a0 The attached table of hourly capture of votes \u00a0cast shows there are hourly bands with votes \u00a0in excess of 3000\/2000 \u00a0votes, just as there several hourly bands with total votes cast far less \u00a0than \u00a01000 \u00a0votes, \u00a0The question is which of these hourly bands reflect the alleged “exact geometric progression”? It is important \u00a0to note that at commencement of the election, Mr Ikuwazom, SAN was in 2nd<\/sup> place in the votes cast at least in \u00a0the \u00a0early hours \u00a0until later when \u00a0the \u00a0vote \u00a0tally of Mr.\u00a0Erojikwe increased and pushed him to 2nd<\/sup> \u00a0<\/em>place with Mr Ikuwazorn SAN dropping to 3rd<\/sup> . It is therefore incorrect \u00a0to allege as\u00a0 Ikuwazorn and his supporters suggested in social media posts that he was placed third all through the election, nor was there an exactitude attributable to votes progression of any candidate.<\/p>\nECNBA and our Service Providers were and remain committed to maintaining the integrity\u00a0 of the\u00a0 election process \u00a0and \u00a0ensuring that \u00a0every vote \u00a0cast is accurately reflected in the final results. To put out an allegation of pre-programming of voting results without any fact of such is to \u00a0maliciously deprecate the reputation of the international companies and Service Providers employed by ECNBA, and indeed of members \u00a0of the \u00a0ECNBA as being co-conspirators\u00a0 in pre-programming vote patterns, yet offering no shred of fact in justification. We continue to urge restraint in our \u00a0use of words to express our dissatisfaction, so as to avoid a misinformation of members and the public, or denigrating reputations of men and\/or institutions built over several decades.<\/p>\n
\nDiscrepancies in Vote Patterns<\/em><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\nIt was alleged by Mr. lkwuazom SAN that “reported \u00a0voting figures show inconsistencies with the actual votes cast” by his supporters, \u00a0therefore \u00a0suggesting manipulation of the system. It is important to clarify that the choices made by voters in their ballots are private and confidential. It is not possible for any contestant to know with certainty how individual voters or indeed his said supporters have cast their votes. Did the 40,656 voters who participated (of which 9,018 \u00a0voters cast their ballots for Mr Ikuwazom) show you their e-ballots to know who they really voted for? Actual votes cast by any candidate’s \u00a0supporters are. only known \u00a0to each voter. Extrapolating from assurances given you by supporters,\u00a0 to match against actual reported voting figures tallied, offers no scientific basis of arriving at your conclusions\u00a0 \u00a0sirs. While\u00a0 \u00a0we cannot\u00a0\u00a0 imagine the \u00a0possibility of \u00a0this \u00a0claim \u00a0in \u00a0any scenario, 1, we \u00a0are open \u00a0to understanding \u00a0how \u00a0you gained \u00a0access to the \u00a0actual votes cast by the said supporters as that \u00a0remains \u00a0the onlv way to \u00a0conclusively assert vour expected \u00a0voting pattern \u00a0against the actual votes cast, especially in an\u00a0 electronic voting system. We find no basis for this assertion sirs.<\/p>\n
\nThat \u00a0the \u00a0number \u00a0of\u00a0 votes \u00a0ascribed \u00a0to \u00a0the \u00a0winning \u00a0candidate steadily increased in an almost exact geometric progression \u00a0at the top of each hour \u00a0for nearly \u00a0the \u00a0entirety \u00a0of \u00a0the \u00a0election \u00a0in \u00a0a \u00a0manner \u00a0is \u00a0demonstrative of \u00a0a\u00a0 pre programming of votes:<\/strong><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\nIn \u00a0addition \u00a0to answers in paragraph \u00a03 above, note \u00a0that \u00a0the\u00a0 number \u00a0of votes attributed to\u00a0 all \u00a0candidates \u00a0is \u00a0an \u00a0exact reflection \u00a0of \u00a0the \u00a0ballots \u00a0cast \u00a0by the participants over the course of the election period. A claim of a steady increase pattern without specifying the \u00a0ratio of such a “steady \u00a0increase’ \u00a0is baseless. \u00a0To provide clarity, we \u00a0have \u00a0attached \u00a0an \u00a0hourly \u00a0table \u00a0of \u00a0votes\u00a0 cast. \u00a0This \u00a0table demonstrates that the votes cast each hour by all voters do not follow a steady or even increase, thus disproving the claim of a pre-programmed vote allocation. The vote\u00a0 increase \u00a0pattern\u00a0 observed \u00a0is \u00a0a \u00a0natural \u00a0result \u00a0of \u00a0member\u00a0 participation throughout the election period.<\/p>\n
\n That \u00a0the number \u00a0of votes cast for candidates at different positions during the course of the election did not tally.<\/em><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\nFor interim results (while the election is ongoing), the platform processed votes in a sequential manner, \u00a0reviewing each position and question independently before moving on to the next one. Each set of results is stored separately as it compiles the subsequent ones. \u00a0Given there were 13 positions being vied for (10 National offices and 3 General Council of the Bar Bloc Regional slots), a vote can be included in the results for a subsequent compilation, depending on when it was cast during the ongoing compilation process.<\/p>\n
This sequential processing can lead to temporary disparities in the. totals displayed at intervals for different positions, while minute by minute snapshots were being viewed \u00a0as the system tallied votes. \u00a0For example, results presented \u00a0at 8AM may show wider disparities compared to those at 4 AM due to a higher volume of votes being cast and processed at that time. Additionally, as the number \u00a0of ballots cast increases, the time required for compilation also increases. Consequently, results at 4 PM may take a bit longer to compile than those at 4 AM, providing more opportunity for votes to be cast during the compilation process of each position.<\/p>\n
This \u00a0is why the\u00a0 ECNBA\u00a0 \u00a0labelled \u00a0these \u00a0interim \u00a0views of results \u00a0using \u00a0the phrase “Vote \u00a0Count” \u00a0and also \u00a0included \u00a0a time stamp \u00a0in the results so it is dear \u00a0this is an interim result view. At the end of the voting period, the final official results were compiled \u00a0for\u00a0 the last time and \u00a0consistency was confirmed \u00a0across all categories leading to the final results.<\/p>\n
\nThat while the actual voting took place on the platform provided by Election Buddy \u00a0<\/em>i.<\/em>e. electionbuddy.com, \u00a0the \u00a0live election \u00a0results \u00a0were \u00a0exhibited \u00a0on \u00a0a completely different \u00a0and \u00a0unrelated \u00a0platform, go.ecnba.org. \u00a0Technical \u00a0experts engaged by me find this rather curious and strange, and it questions the integrity of the results. \u00a0As a technical matter, it leads to irresistible inference that the results purportedly projected on the ecnba.org platform as live results of the election were simulated results that may,likely,be different from those at the backend servers of Election Buddy:<\/em><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\nThe full certification of results by Election Buddy and delivered to the ECNBA immediately after the election negates this allegation. This certification is based on all the information available on the backend\u00a0 servers of Election Buddy and the information displayed on go.ecnba.org\u00a0 is consistent with the certification of results. The \u00a0complete voting information \u00a0has been \u00a0securely provided \u00a0to the\u00a0 ECNBA. Below is additional technical information \u00a0on \u00a0the\u00a0 process \u00a0and \u00a0thinking for the viewing portal go.ecnba.org.<\/p>\n
From the\u00a0 original 72,071 eligible voters on \u00a0the Voters list, 72,059 voters were uploaded on the voter platform as eligible (less 12 blanked out voters with strange SCN numbers starting with EXM …… \u00a0which were invalidated by the Supreme Court enrolment office, and which fact had been earlier presented to stakeholders on 12th<\/sup> July 2024) to participate in the 2024 NBA elections. \u00a0The platform where. the votes were cast must therefore have had more than enough capacity for this number of voters. \u00a0Based \u00a0on past \u00a0NBA \u00a0election \u00a0experience, we found the\u00a0 viewership of election results extends beyond the eligible voters. Concerned\u00a0 citizens, observers, Non-Eligible\/Non-Voting lawyers, Non-lawyers and curious individuals within and outside \u00a0Nigeria, and many others \u00a0follow the results. This \u00a0means\u00a0 that while the system \u00a0for elections\u00a0 \u00a0is designed to sufficiently handle \u00a0the \u00a0expected number \u00a0of voters {72,059), the results display page must be able to handle much more traffic than the voter traffic without freezing nor \u00a0downtime. \u00a0This \u00a0was one \u00a0of the key lessons learnt from the previous online NBA elections \u00a0held by past ECNBA. As a matter of fact, in one of such past NBA elections, there were over 3.7 million hits on the election results page alone from all over the world!<\/p>\nIt was therefore imperative to ensure:<\/p>\n
\nThat the voting process, \u00a0result \u00a0compilation, \u00a0and \u00a0experience \u00a0by voters \u00a0were not affected by the traffic to the result viewing site.<\/li>\n Detailed \u00a0snapshots\u00a0 \u00a0of the \u00a0results \u00a0are \u00a0periodically taken \u00a0and \u00a0presented \u00a0on go.ecnba.org \u00a0on\u00a0 \u00a0a \u00a0public\u00a0 \u00a0URL \u00a0that\u00a0 \u00a0anyone\u00a0 \u00a0can\u00a0 \u00a0visit\u00a0\u00a0 easily \u00a0and\u00a0 \u00a0see conveniently.<\/li>\n That we had a system architecture design that would \u00a0support this separation of processes. \u00a0A good \u00a0solution \u00a0architect \u00a0knows \u00a0how critical this is.<\/li>\n That \u00a0the infrastructure \u00a0is optimized \u00a0based \u00a0on its primary \u00a0function.<\/li>\n That we had \u00a0the right rules \u00a0in place to \u00a0repel \u00a0all cyber \u00a0threats \u00a0we could \u00a0be subjected \u00a0to.<\/li>\n Well-architected designs follow a similar pattern.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\u00a0At a point \u00a0in time, the results \u00a0viewing page started receiving a massive flood\u00a0 of hits, matching \u00a0the \u00a0characteristics of a Denial \u00a0of Service. \u00a0(DoS) \u00a0attack. \u00a0Details \u00a0of these will be in the final post-election\u00a0 \u00a0report.<\/p>\n
In the digital world, a DoS attack happens \u00a0when \u00a0a hacker \u00a0attempts \u00a0to \u00a0overwhelm \u00a0a website \u00a0or online service with an excessive amount \u00a0of traffic or requests, with the intention\u00a0 of making \u00a0it unable \u00a0to function \u00a0properly \u00a0and preventing legitimate \u00a0users from \u00a0accessing \u00a0it. If successful, \u00a0such \u00a0a disruption\u00a0 \u00a0can \u00a0cause \u00a0inconvenience and damage \u00a0to the reputation\u00a0 of the affected service.\u00a0 This \u00a0means a successful \u00a0Denial \u00a0of Service would have blocked \u00a0access to the results viewing page and raised \u00a0concerns with everyone. However, we had already prepared for the possibility \u00a0that someone or a group of persons may attempt \u00a0to do this and we were able to handle \u00a0and ensure the results \u00a0viewing page \u00a0remained \u00a0available by reason\u00a0 \u00a0of the\u00a0 system \u00a0architecture. solution \u00a0employed.<\/p>\n
Regarding \u00a0the specific concern \u00a0about \u00a0voting on Election \u00a0Buddy \u00a0and vewing results on go.ecnba.org:<\/p>\n
\nSingle Election Platform:<\/em> \u00a0There was only one \u00a0election \u00a0platform \u00a0for voting, which was Election \u00a0Buddy. \u00a0All votes were cast on this secure platform.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\nResults Display and Information Hub<\/em>:The go.ecnba.org \u00a0platform \u00a0was used exclusively \u00a0to display \u00a0the\u00a0 results of the\u00a0 elections \u00a0and \u00a0provide \u00a0valuable \u00a0pre election \u00a0information and instructional \u00a0guides for public consumption. \u00a0There was no \u00a0separate \u00a0platform \u00a0for \u00a0voting for \u00a0the \u00a0elections.\u00a0 \u00a0The \u00a0voting \u00a0platform for the NBA 2024 Election was provided \u00a0and run by ElectionBuddy. Only ElectionBuddy.com was used\u00a0 \u00a0for \u00a0voting.\u00a0 The\u00a0 go.ecnba.org\u00a0 portal \u00a0was merely \u00a0a viewing\u00a0 portal \u00a0(It is like \u00a0a viewing \u00a0screen \u00a0in an overflow \u00a0canopy outside \u00a0an event center, to provide \u00a0a view of the event happening in the event hall. Offering that view outside \u00a0the hall controls viewing traffic from flooding the main event hall where \u00a0the main \u00a0event \u00a0is happening yet watching \u00a0same event \u00a0in the hall. It can also be likened to our watching on a television set at home a live soccer match in a stadium. Whereas you may not be inside the stadium, you are watching the same match being played in the stadium on your TV set at home, and not a different match. The go.ecnba.org page was not a voting platform and any ICT expert worth his claim can go on the said portal and verify to \u00a0see it was never a voting site but a viewing portal only.<\/li>\nFamiliar Platform:<\/em>The go.ecnba.org website had been widely circulated by the ECNBA through various channels, including videos, \u00a0broadcasts, sensitization meetings across regions, and notices, ensuring that voters were already\u00a0 familiar with it. It is contained \u00a0in \u00a0the \u00a0animated \u00a0videos \u00a0widely circulated pre-election and announced as the result viewingplatform ahead of elections.<\/li>\nPost-Vote Confirmation:<\/em> After a voter casts their vote, the confirmation message \u00a0includes \u00a0a \u00a0link \u00a0to see \u00a0the \u00a0results\u00a0 on \u00a0go.ecnba.org, providing seamless navigation from voting to result viewing,<\/li>\nSecure Connection:<\/em> The go.ecnba.org was securely connected to the results page and was projecting that information throughout the election period, ensuring accuracy and integrity.<\/li>\nTraffic Management:<\/em> By directing the significant traffic to the result viewing page, we were able to protect the voting pages from potential overload, ensuring a smooth voting experiencefor all eligible voters. We\u00a0 thus avoided the negative experiences of past elections.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\nSome Voters reported receiving emails acknowledging that their votes had been submitted even before they had the opportunity to cast their votes. Others reported \u00a0subsequently receiving another link to cast their votes. In other words, these were demonstrable instances of double-voting or at least data manipulation.<\/strong><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\u00a0We implemented a robust system to prevent double-voting in the election process using Ele.ctionBuddy. \u00a0Each voter receives a unique \u00a0voting link, which is securely generated and distributed individuallv. This unique link is dispatched by Email and \u00a0SMS to Eligible Voters \u00a0via the\u00a0 Email \u00a0and \u00a0Phone\u00a0 \u00a0Number\u00a0 \u00a0attached\u00a0 \u00a0to \u00a0their profile on the list of eligible voters.<\/p>\n
The voter would also need to provide their unique SCN to unlock their own ballot on that link. Once a vote is cast using this unique\u00a0 link, it becomes inactive and cannot be used again, thereby preventing duplicate votes. This method guarantees the \u00a0integrity of the election \u00a0by ensuring \u00a0that\u00a0 each \u00a0voter \u00a0can \u00a0only vote once, maintaining a fair and transparent voting process. While we do not see the svstern design allowing the possibility of this complaint raised, we would like to explore the validity of this claim by requesting for a pool of the SCN numbers of persons you claim experienced this challenge. \u00a0Without this it would be mere speculation for anyone to make such a claim without proof. Note if a person claims his vote had been \u00a0submitted without him\u00a0 participating, he \u00a0must have received an acknowledgment \u00a0of such\u00a0 submission. If he claims he later upon \u00a0complaining, received a second link, did he vote with the said second link. If he claims he did, then \u00a0he must have received a second acknowledgment of vote code, \u00a0which we would find incredibly impracticable given our system security. The \u00a0platform also secures from voting manipulation \u00a0by providing a unique confirmation code to a voter after the ballot is cast, and emailed to them. \u00a0It is a representation of their entire ballot for the purpose of protecting their choices. It would be impossible to change \u00a0their voting records \u00a0on \u00a0any basis, hence \u00a0making double \u00a0voting in this election almost impossible and unbelievable.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, if you can send us the SCNs of such complainants, we will definitely offer you more detailed facts related to such a case beyond what you may have been told.<\/p>\n
\n Despite the fact that the election was widely advertised to commence by<\/em> 12:00am and end by 11 \u00a0:59 pm on Saturday<\/em> 20 July2024, voting<\/em> continued into the early hours of Sunday 21 July 2024 and the number of votes continued to increase.<\/em><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\nThe compilation of results were completed at past midnight when the voting closed. The final compilation of results is an intensive process because it includes a ballot by ballot check,vote by vote verification and integrity check. It also includes a check for any tampering. All the voting data is tamper evident, making it very difficult to manipulate the results of the election. This is one of the most powerful features of the voting platform provided by ElectionBuddy.<\/p>\n
However,due to a surge towards the \u00a0final minutes of the voting period, it meant it was critical to wait and fully complete this check when voting closed. This as expected\u00a0 resulted in \u00a0the \u00a0number\u00a0 of votes \u00a0changing \u00a0as the \u00a0final compilation\u00a0 was taking place. A total of 23 votes dropped after midnight and processed. At close of polls, It was transparently made clear on the result display screen that the final compilation was taking place and it was also made clear when the final compilation was completed. As seen in the ElectionBuddy certified results annexed, the final results issued out at 12.57am \u00a0West \u00a0African Time.<\/p>\n
REQUESTS \u00a0BY COMPLAINANTS<\/strong><\/p>\nWe have escalated your respective requests \u00a0for\u00a0 access and \u00a0information \u00a0to the electronic voting service \u00a0provider \u00a0(E-Buddy), and while the \u00a0post-election audit process is still on, we are only able to make the following responses, \u00a0and documents annexed available to you, in addition to the given explanations above and below. Where requested documents\u00a0 are unavailable, the reason for such are also clearly stated. We therefore have copied below the responses \u00a0from the Service Provider:<\/p>\n
a. <\/strong>Request for full access to server and application log files used during the election period.<\/strong><\/p>\nThe log information \u00a0would \u00a0contain information \u00a0that is not\u00a0 specific to \u00a0ECNBA votes. Access to these logs would expose other user’s\u00a0 sensitive information and would constitute \u00a0a \u00a0breach\u00a0 \u00a0of \u00a0data. This\u00a0 is\u00a0 contrary\u00a0 to the GDPR, and NDPA\\NDPR compliance \u00a0regulations. As you are \u00a0aware, Election Buddy \u00a0Inc provides \u00a0its services to tons of organizations\u00a0 and nations globally using the same servers and application files, hence giving one user access clearly compromises the entire credibility of their servers carrying other users’ data. It is like a bank. customer demanding access to the bank’s server because of an alleged entry in his statement of account, whereas the same server holds thousands of other customers’ financial and\u00a0 \u00a0personal\u00a0 \u00a0data. Your\u00a0 request will\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0render Election Buddy Inc liable professionally and\u00a0 contractually\u00a0 to\u00a0 other users of\u00a0 \u00a0their platform,\u00a0 ence unacceptable.<\/p>\n
b. Access to the election systems architecture documentation.<\/strong><\/p>\nThis was provided \u00a0to the Electoral Committee\u00a0 of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA) at the bidding stage and a copy will be provided with this response (See Annexure C).<\/p>\n
c. Complete\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0database\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0records,\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0including\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0voter\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0information\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0and\u00a0 \u00a0voting transactions.<\/strong><\/p>\nVoter \u00a0information\u00a0 \u00a0concerning voters cannot \u00a0be provided \u00a0as this is a direct violation of the privacy of their ballot choices and infringes the Data Privacy Act. Except \u00a0you provide us with the consent \u00a0letters of the voters whose \u00a0voting transaction\u00a0 data you seek, we cannot \u00a0ex-pose to \u00a0you such private \u00a0data of voters choices.<\/p>\n
d. Network \u00a0traffic logs from \u00a0the election\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\nThe \u00a0network traffic logs requested \u00a0encompass much \u00a0more information\u00a0 \u00a0than just data pertaining to this NBA election,\u00a0 as Election \u00a0Buddy \u00a0system supports \u00a0multiple clients simultaneously, Sharing \u00a0these logs would risk exposing\u00a0 sensitive. information unrelated\u00a0 \u00a0to the NBA \u00a0vote, \u00a0compromising\u00a0 \u00a0the privacy and security \u00a0of others.<\/p>\n
To\u00a0 address \u00a0the integrity and transparency of the election \u00a0process, \u00a0a certification \u00a0of results\u00a0 \u00a0letter\u00a0 \u00a0signed\u00a0\u00a0 by \u00a0the\u00a0 \u00a0President \u00a0of \u00a0Election\u00a0 \u00a0Buddy,\u00a0 \u00a0a \u00a0Certified\u00a0 \u00a0Public Accountant (CPA), \u00a0Dave\u00a0 Bodnarchuk, \u00a0was provided. \u00a0This \u00a0certification, \u00a0attached here, \u00a0attests to the fairness\u00a0 and accuracy \u00a0of the election, \u00a0ensuring \u00a0that only eligible voters \u00a0as represented \u00a0on the Voters list participated,\u00a0 \u00a0each voter \u00a0only voted once, and \u00a0all votes \u00a0were securely \u00a0processed and \u00a0recorded. \u00a0Based \u00a0on\u00a0 the \u00a0independent review \u00a0and \u00a0the \u00a0stringent \u00a0criteria\u00a0 \u00a0applied,\u00a0 \u00a0we\u00a0 are \u00a0confident\u00a0 \u00a0in. the \u00a0integrity \u00a0and security of the election \u00a0process. \u00a0The \u00a0attached \u00a0certification letter\u00a0 (Annexture \u00a0D) and final\u00a0 \u00a0results\u00a0 \u00a0provide\u00a0 \u00a0detailed\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0attestation\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0to \u00a0the\u00a0 \u00a0credibility\u00a0 \u00a0of\u00a0 \u00a0the\u00a0 \u00a0election.<\/p>\n
\u00a0We trust this \u00a0certification\u00a0 \u00a0letter, \u00a0along \u00a0with \u00a0the \u00a0detailed\u00a0 \u00a0procedures\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0it\u00a0 outlines, address \u00a0your concerns \u00a0regarding \u00a0the election’s \u00a0transparency\u00a0 \u00a0and accuracy.<\/p>\n
e. All incident response \u00a0documentation\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0or reports from \u00a0the election \u00a0cycle.<\/strong><\/p>\nNo \u00a0incidents\u00a0 to report. The\u00a0 ECNBA\u00a0 will receive \u00a0a detailed\u00a0 \u00a0post-election\u00a0 \u00a0audit report from Election\u00a0 \u00a0Buddy\/INlTl’S \u00a0Consortium\u00a0 \u00a0as captured in the terms \u00a0for the purposes\u00a0\u00a0 of documenting \u00a0all activities,\u00a0\u00a0lessons \u00a0and recommendations.<\/p>\n
f. Details of security measures and protocols implemented for the election<\/strong><\/p>\n\nSecure \u00a0software development life-cycle implementation<\/li>\n SSL,TLS transport\u00a0 security<\/li>\n Data validation \u00a0and sanitization, \u00a0Database \u00a0Boundarv validations \u00a0before \u00a0data persisted<\/li>\n Database \u00a0encryption<\/li>\n Content \u00a0distribution\u00a0 \u00a0networks integration to prevent DDOS<\/li>\n Web application \u00a0firewall<\/li>\n Black Box\/white\u00a0Box penetration\u00a0 \u00a0tests<\/li>\n<\/ul>\ng. Detailed\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0logs\u00a0 \u00a0of\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0all\u00a0 \u00a0voter\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0authentication\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0attempts,\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0successful\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0and unsuccessful,\u00a0 \u00a0to investigate \u00a0the reported identity \u00a0theft issues.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\nThe \u00a0information you request is considered\u00a0 \u00a0sensitive and private.\u00a0 These logs contain data \u00a0that \u00a0can \u00a0potentially\u00a0 \u00a0correlate \u00a0with \u00a0the \u00a0ballot \u00a0choices\u00a0 \u00a0made\u00a0 \u00a0by voters,\u00a0 thus compromising \u00a0their anonymity \u00a0and violating the principle \u00a0of the confidential \u00a0voting process\u00a0 \u00a0promised.\u00a0 \u00a0Protecting\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0the \u00a0identity\u00a0 \u00a0and \u00a0privacy \u00a0of \u00a0voters\u00a0 \u00a0is \u00a0of \u00a0utmost importance,\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0hence\u00a0 \u00a0sharing\u00a0 \u00a0these\u00a0 \u00a0detailed\u00a0 \u00a0information, \u00a0even\u00a0 \u00a0for \u00a0investigative purposes, that may be copied \u00a0and further \u00a0shared \u00a0to your team, could inadvertently ex-pose voter identities \u00a0and private \u00a0information,\u00a0 \u00a0which we must avoid, \u00a0to maintain the integrity of the electoral \u00a0process.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, \u00a0to assist your inquiry, \u00a0if you still require it, we may be able to arrange a joint sit-down review of the logs with our Service \u00a0Provider,at which meeting you may explore and ask questions on it. We are however unable to provide you a copy of confidential data that may expose voter choices.<\/p>\n
h. A complete record of voting timestamps for all cast ballots to analyse voting patterns and potential anomalies.<\/strong><\/p>\nThis is only provided here on an hourly basis to preserve the identity of the voters. Attached as Annexure “A” to this response is the related information.<\/p>\n
i.Documentation of any changes or updates made to the voting system before, during,or immediatelyafter the election period.<\/strong><\/p>\nNo changes were made. Penetration Testing results were shared with the ECNBA regarding the security posture of the platform before the elections and no modifications \u00a0to the \u00a0architecture \u00a0or \u00a0components were carried \u00a0out \u00a0during\u00a0 and immediately after the election.<\/p>\n
j. Records of all individuals who had administrative access to the voting system during the election period.<\/strong><\/p>\nFor security and privacy reasons, we are unable to disclose specific details about administrative access beyond that this was highly limited and an admin audit shows no changes were made or votingcredentials revealed or accessed throughoutthe election. Limited administrativeaccess was granted within Election Budd\/NITS consortium only, \u00a0following \u00a0stringent security protocols and \u00a0was monitored \u00a0to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the election process.<\/p>\n
k,\u00a0 \u00a0Copies \u00a0of all data \u00a0backups \u00a0taken \u00a0before, \u00a0during, \u00a0and \u00a0after the \u00a0election process.<\/strong><\/p>\nThe backup containsproprietary,and other clients data as ElectionBuddy provides services to other clients. \u00a0The \u00a0backup consists of other clients data and therefore could not be shared due to confidentialityand \u00a0contractualclauses.<\/p>\n
l. All documentation of APIs and their usage logs. <\/strong><\/p>\nAPIs are proprietary and for use in the elections onlv.<\/p>\n
m. Detailed logs of any system errors, including timeouts and database update freezes.<\/strong><\/p>\nThe platformwas over provisioned for compute, storage and database. Therefore, we did not have any update or system\/database freezes during the election.<\/p>\n
n. All formal records of voter complaints or reported issues during the<\/strong> election.<\/strong><\/p>\nThis has been categorized and a summarv will be shared along with this response (See Anne.xure B).<\/p>\n
o. Data on \u00a0system performance\u00a0 \u00a0throughout \u00a0the \u00a0election \u00a0period, \u00a0including server response times and load<\/strong><\/p>\nPrior\u00a0 \u00a0to\u00a0 \u00a0and\u00a0\u00a0 during\u00a0 \u00a0the\u00a0 \u00a0election\u00a0\u00a0 period,\u00a0 \u00a0comprehensive \u00a0data\u00a0\u00a0 on\u00a0 \u00a0system performance was collected, including server response times and load statistics. The ECNBA had requested thorough load testing to ensure system robustness. As part of these preparations, server configurations were optimized to handle a peak load of 75 <\/em>votes per second.<\/p>\nThroughout the voting process, the system performed efficiently, with server usage metrics \u00a0indicating \u00a0that \u00a0the \u00a0infrastructure \u00a0was \u00a0well within \u00a0operational \u00a0limits. Specifically, the maximum server usage recorded was about 20% for the database servers and \u00a014% \u00a0for the \u00a0application servers,\u00a0 \u00a0This \u00a0indicates that the \u00a0system was operatingwith significantheadroom,ensuringsmooth and responsiveperformance even at peak times.<\/p>\n
Additionally, server response times remained consistently low, ensuring a seamless voting \u00a0experience for \u00a0users,\u00a0 \u00a0Load\u00a0 \u00a0statistics \u00a0showed \u00a0that\u00a0\u00a0 the \u00a0system \u00a0could comfortably handle the voting traffic, with no significant latency or downtime.<\/p>\n
These metrics highlight the effectiveness \u00a0of the load testing and server tuning efforts undertaken\u00a0 \u00a0prior \u00a0to the election, \u00a0ensuring \u00a0a reliable \u00a0and efficient voting process.<\/p>\n
p. Detailed logs of all PNG image \u00a0uploads to the ecnba.org\/results\/ portal, including timestamps, file sizes, and the account or process responsible for these uploads.<\/strong><\/p>\nThe P<\/strong>N<\/strong>Gs were snapshots of the tallies of ballots that were cast and saved at that point \u00a0in \u00a0time \u00a0and \u00a0were automatically updated.\u00a0 The \u00a0latest P’.\\’G replaced the previous one to ensure any visits to the results viewing page would always return the latest snapshot of the results. The \u00a0P<\/strong>N<\/strong>Gs had an average size of 283KB. \u00a0Only the latest and final P<\/strong>N<\/strong>G taken at the end is available. This is available as Annexure E.<\/strong><\/p>\nq.Documentation on the process and protocolsused to transfer data from the primary election platform \u00a0(electionbuddy.com) to the display portal (go.ecnba.org).<\/p>\n
There \u00a0was no transfer of data from the primary election platform to the display portal. \u00a0The \u00a0go.ecnba.org \u00a0portal \u00a0was merely\u00a0 a \u00a0presentation \u00a0laver \u00a0to what was available from the ElectionBuddy results page.<\/p>\n
r. All third-party service logs and reports from these services.<\/strong><\/p>\nLogs for third party services like CDN providers cannot be provided as multiple customers use the sen ice and reports will contain information for unrelated users.<\/p>\n
\nCONCLUDING ST<\/strong>A<\/strong>TEMENT<\/strong>S <\/strong>BY ECNBA<\/strong><\/p>\nIt has been a grueling and tasking assignment organizing a seamless Bar elections in 2024 given our \u00a0past experiences. \u00a0Viie left no stone\u00b7 unturned, \u00a0anticipating all probabilities and challenges and remedying same ahead of the elections. \u00a0The above responses and explanations clearly show the interest of ECNBA and om Sen ice. Providers were clearly to ensure a credible and transparent process and election, and as much as possible avoid past system challenges and attendant controversies. This is evident in our multiple messaging, notices, engagements with stakeholders, etc. vVe sourced for and\u00a0 deployed upscaled technology, redesigned a fail-proof system structure, \u00a0all in a bid to assure our candidates and voters of a very credible election and process, and provide a satisfactory voter experience. \u00a0Voterswho called our \u00a0helplines had their issues either satisfactorilv sorted, explained, resolved or politely declined where the demand was beyond EC~BA mandate or incapable of being addressed. Our final reports will contain re.commendations from ECNBA and \u00a0our \u00a0Service Providers, \u00a0of ways and \u00a0steps to \u00a0even make the\u00a0 process \u00a0more seamless beyond the success of the 2024 elections.<\/p>\n
While we appreciateyour disappointment at the Joss of an election, we do not think every loss should be attributed to mischief and unwholesome practices as alleged by \u00a0your \u00a0complaints.\u00a0 \u00a0ECNBA members\u00a0 \u00a0and \u00a0our \u00a0Service \u00a0Providers \u00a0at commencement were required to sign up to undertakings warranting no conflict of interest in respect of our assigned tasks, all in a bid to ensure full commitment of all, even at the\u00a0 risk of actionable legal steps against such, where any conflict of interest issue arises against any member or provider. Besides, we can attest to \u00a0the credibility and \u00a0authenticity \u00a0of \u00a0the \u00a0voting \u00a0process \u00a0and \u00a0re.suits as \u00a0me.e.ting\u00a0 a significantly substantial compliance \u00a0test measured \u00a0on all parameters. ViTe would expect that where candidates\u00a0 do not quite understand \u00a0an employed \u00a0process or system, a \u00a0simple\u00a0 question \u00a0to ECNBA, rather \u00a0than \u00a0published \u00a0accusations and allegations would provide valuable answers to \u00a0clarify. The \u00a0ECNBA, Candidates and\u00a0 NBA \u00a0Members \u00a0are Partners \u00a0in progress \u00a0for the purpose \u00a0of our\u00a0 common objective of electing officers.<\/p>\n
We do hope the above preliminary response provides you both valuable insights and answers to your contestations and requests. Should you have further need for more information, you may provide us specific details of instances of any infraction with traceable data of persons \u00a0affected and we shall interrogate and provide you further answers, otherwise we advise that you kindly await our final post-election report and audit in the next few weeks, for an even more detailed information.<\/p>\n
Thank you and accept. our sincere \u00a0regards. Yours \u00a0faithfully,<\/p>\n
Dated \u00a0this 25″ July 2024<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
25″ July 2024 Messrs \u00a0Chukwuka \u00a0Ikwuazom \u00a0SAN; Tobenna Erojikwe Gentlemen, RE:\u00a0\u00a0REOUEST\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0FOR\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0ACCESS\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0TO\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0CRITICAL\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0INFORMATION REGARDING THE \u00a02024 NBA NATIONAL \u00a0ELECTIONS We refer\u00a0 to \u00a0your letters, \u00a0namely \u00a0that of Mr.\u00a0 Chukwuka \u00a0Ikwuazom, SAN dated 21st \u00a0July 2024 and \u00a0received \u00a0by email \u00a0at 10:24pm\u00a0 \u00a0of same \u00a0day, \u00a0and \u00a0the letter \u00a0from \u00a0Mr. Tobenna \u00a0Erojikwe dated […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":85811,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_hide_featured_image":false,"_jetpack_featured_image_duplicate_dismissed":0,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[4,5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-85797","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-nba-news","category-news"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t
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<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n