{"id":88061,"date":"2025-02-04T08:36:04","date_gmt":"2025-02-04T08:36:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/dnllegalandstyle.com\/dnl\/?p=88061"},"modified":"2025-02-04T08:36:09","modified_gmt":"2025-02-04T08:36:09","slug":"ghl-vs-fbn-two-sides-of-a-ruling","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dnllegalandstyle.com\/dnl\/ghl-vs-fbn-two-sides-of-a-ruling\/","title":{"rendered":"GHL vs FBN: Two Sides of a Ruling"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Onikepo Braithwaite<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

GHL v FBN\/ FBN & Anor v GHL & Ors<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Subsequent upon the Ex-Parte Orders granted by Dehinde Dipeolu J<\/strong>. of the Federal High Court, Lagos Division on December 30, 2024 in Suit No: FHC\/L\/CS\/2378\/2024 First Bank Plc & Anor v GHL & Ors<\/strong> (ex-parte order(s)), GHL, and the 2nd-5th Defendant in this matter filed two motions on notice, both dated 13\/1\/25, inter alia, to set aside the ex-parte orders of 30\/12\/24; the court ruled on these motions on January 29, 2025 (January 29 ruling).The front cover headlines of Leadership and The Nation newspapers of 30\/1\/25, then announced that some of the ex-parte orders had survived the January 29 ruling, namely Orders 6-11, and this appears to be a source of confusion. Previously, GHL had gone to the Federal High Court Lagos Division first, in Suit No: FHC\/L\/CS\/1953\/2024 per Lewis Allagoa J. <\/strong>where it had secured some preservative orders against First Bank (FBN).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Rulings<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A perusal of the 138-page January 29 ruling (of which about 104 pages were a regurgitation of the court processes and arguments of Counsel), immediately showed that two motions on notice were argued, first, that of GHL (1st Defendant\/Applicant) and second, that of Nduka, Efe and Eka Obaigbena and GHL 121 Ltd (2nd-5th Defendant\/ Applicants). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

GHL\u2019s encompassing\u00a0\u00a0application was for\u00a0\u201cAn order setting aside, vacating, discharging and\/or suspending<\/em>\u00a0the interim Mareva Orders and other orders<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0made by this Honourable court on 30th December, 2024 pursuant to the Motion Ex-Parte of the Plaintiffs\u00a0\u00a0for the grant of same\u2026..\u201d<\/em>. And, at\u00a0\u00a0Page 73 of the January 29 ruling, Dipeolu J. held thus:\u00a0\u201c\u2026. I hold that the 1st Defendant\/Applicant\u2019s Motion on Notice dated 13th of January, 2025 succeeds, the Mareva Order of 30th December, 2024 is hereby set aside\u201d.\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>See the case of\u00a0UTB Ltd & Ors v Dolmetsch Pharmacy (Nig) Ltd (2007) LPELR-3413(SC) per Walter Samuel Nkanu Onnoghen, JSC (later CJN<\/strong>) (also cited on Page 58 of the January 29 ruling) where the Supreme Court listed eight grounds on which a court will set aside, vary or discharge an interim injunction made ex-parte, including suppression or misrepresentation of material facts, order irregularly granted and non-disclosure of material facts. These three grounds appear to have been present when the ex-parte orders were made, and therefore, fertile ground for the setting aside of same. His Lordship Onnoghen, JSC, had stated that where there\u2019s non-disclosure of material facts,\u00a0\u201cThe law is that the court will deal strictly with a party applying ex-parte, and who had misrepresented or suppressed material facts\u201d<\/em><\/strong>. I submit that FBN\u2019s failure to inform Dipeolu J that the matter was already before Lewis-Allagoa J and that some preservative orders had already been made by him specifically, nor attach the orders, appear to fit like a glove into two of the grounds on which an ex-parte order will be set aside.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the January 29 ruling, Dipeolu J. didn\u2019t hold that GHL\u2019s motion succeeds in part or half or quarter; he held that it succeeds, which would mean that all 13 ex-parte orders were set aside as prayed by GHL. Wouldn\u2019t it be incongruous therefore, for any of the orders to thereafter, survive? See Order 26 Part B of the\u00a0Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019<\/strong>\u00a0on Ex-Parte motions and their lifespan. Also see\u00a0Titilayo Plastic Industries Ltd & Ors v Fagbola (2019) LPELR-47606(SC) per Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili, JSC<\/strong>. How could any other relief granted by the ex-parte order survive, when the prayer in GHL\u2019s motion on notice was that all the 13 orders in the motion ex-parte, that is, the Mareva Orders and other orders, be set aside, and the Judge ruled that the application succeeded? When it is held that a decision succeeds, it succeeds wholly; when it succeeds only in part, the decision of the court states as much \u2013\u00a0\u00a0it is a partial relief. We even have appeals, that are allowed in part only.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abuse of Court Process<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two occurrences, clearly point to abuse of court process on the part of First Bank\u2019s Counsel. And, while considering GHL\u2019s motion, on page 60 of the January 29 ruling, Dipeolu J. admitted that First Bank failed to make full disclosure of Lewis-Allagoa J\u2019s earlier judgement; a prerequisite of making an application without the other party being put on notice, is full disclosure of all the relevant facts. Dipeolu J cited\u00a0Polaris Bank Ltd v Bellview Airlines Ltd & Anor (2021) LPELR-56258(CA)<\/strong>\u00a0in support of this position, which held that non-disclosure of material facts was ground for the discharge of an interim order ex-parte and penalising of the Applicant if need be. Also see\u00a0UTB Ltd & Ors v Dolmetsch Pharmacy (Nig) Ltd (Supra),\u00a0<\/strong>on non-disclosure of material facts being one of the grounds on which a court will set aside, vary or discharge an order of interim injunction made ex-parte.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Egbuonu v Borno Radio Television Corporation (1997) LPELR-1040(SC) per Muhammadu Lawal Uwais, JSC (later CJN), <\/strong>the purport of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision  is that,  where a set of facts gives rise to multiple causes of action, if the two causes do not fall within the jurisdiction of the same court then they will be heard in different courts; but, if  one court has jurisdiction to hear both matters, then, perhaps, the two actions may be consolidated and heard in the same court. In GHL v First Bank,<\/strong> FBN\u2019s latter Suit No: 2378 could have been consolidated with GHL\u2019s earlier Suit No:1953 in Allagoa J\u2019s court or if they couldn\u2019t, both cases could have been heard side by side in Lewis-Allagoa J\u2019s court, since both causes of action were given rise to from the same transaction, as admitted by Dipeolu J on page 71 of the January 29 ruling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dipeolu J. then went on to consider the second motion of the 2nd-5th Defendant\/Applicants which had two prayers \u2013 the first to strike out\/dismiss the matter for lack of jurisdiction being an abuse of court process, or in the alternative, the second prayer which was similar to that of GHL\u2019s application, to set aside the ex-parte orders made against the 2nd-5th Defendant\/Applicants. Having failed to identify First Bank\u2019s ex-parte application as the abuse of court of process that it is, at page 138 of the ruling, the court held thus: \u201cTherefore, the 2nd to 5th Defendant\/Applicants\u2019 alternative relief succeeds to the extent that the Mareva Order of 30th December, 2024 is set aside against the 2nd-5th Defendant\u201d.  <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I respectfully submit that, it is contradictory and inconsistent to say in one breath that GHL\u2019s motion which covers all the orders and all the Defendants in the matter succeeds on Page 73, and then proceed to rule on Page 138, that only the Mareva Order was discharged in respect of the 2nd-5th Defendant\/Applicants! Which of the Mareva Orders, by the way? There were two of them (Orders 4 & 5); yet, Dipeolu J. referred to them in the singular! What a confusing ruling! Can the court approbate and reprobate? No. When even litigants, are not supposed to. In Obaje v NAMA (2023) LPELR-61645(SC) per Adamu Jauro, JSC,<\/strong> the Supreme Court held that approbating and reprobating was akin to speaking from two sides of the mouth, and should be frowned upon. In Julius Berger (Nig) Plc v Almighty Projects Innovative Ltd & Anor (2021)  LPELR-56611(SC) per Ejembi Eko, JSC, <\/strong>the Apex Court also held approbating and reprobating was to \u201cblow hot and cold, to affirm at one time and to deny at another time\u2026.. on the same issue\u201d. <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, not only is trite that a court cannot sit as a court of appeal over its own decision, let alone within the same ruling, the first GHL ruling appears to have covered the field. If the earlier ruling on GHL\u2019s motion on notice successfully set aside the Mareva and other orders, with the orders touching on and concerning the 1st-5th Defendant\/Applicants, is it possible for the court to somersault and purport to deliver a second\/different ruling based on the same ex-parte orders within the same ruling? See Obaje v NAMA (Supra). Also see  Julius Berger (Nig) Plc v Almighty Projects Innovative Ltd & Anor (Supra). <\/strong>It is confusing! <\/p>\n\n\n\n

If by Dipeolu J\u2019s own admission, First Bank failed to disclose a material fact, and this is a ground for the setting aside or discharge of an interim ex-parte order, it is only logical  that none of the interim\/Mareva ex-parte orders of 30\/12\/24 could survive the January 29 ruling, as all the orders were hinged on the same misrepresentation\/suppression of facts. Is it possible for the court to indulge in cherry-picking of live and dead orders, in this kind of situation? I think not. See UTB Ltd & Ors v Dolmetsch Pharmacy (Nig) Ltd (Supra).<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elements of a Good Decision <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is trite that one of the elements of a good court ruling or judgement, is that it must be clear and coherent. However, Dipeolu J\u2019s January 29 ruling has been a subject of hot debate since it was handed down, as it appears to have been given two interpretations \u2013 one that the January 29 ruling was completely set aside, and the other that, it kept Orders 6-11 of the 30\/12\/24 ex-parte orders alive! In any event, it may be arguable as to whether the Orders that were purportedly kept alive can survive without the Mareva Orders. In Apugo v Ugona (2022) LPELR-59893(SC) per Kudirat Motonmori Olatokunbo Kekere-Ekun, JSC (now CJN), <\/strong>the Supreme Court held inter alia that \u201c\u2026.a judgement must finally determine the rights of the parties, and must be clear and unambiguous\u201d.<\/em><\/strong> Her Lordship cited the case of Joe Golday Co. Ltd v Co-operative Devt. Bank Plc (2003) LPELR-1617 (SC) per Uwaifo, JSC <\/strong>as follows: \u201cThe Court cannot be expected to make an order which is uncertain, or which is subject to different interpretations as to whether it meets the relief claimed\u201d.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Controversy about the January 29 ruling or not, some facts stand out and seem quite clear. Firstly, that First Bank\u2019s Counsel knowingly and secretly went to secure some ex-parte orders against GHL and others during the Christmas vacation, suppressing material facts which may have prevented the court from granting the 30\/12\/24 orders had they been provided. Dipeolu J. confirmed the non-disclosure of material facts on the part of First Bank, in the ruling. Secondly, First Bank could have appealed the preservative orders granted in Suit No: 1953 by Lewis-Allagoa J. Thirdly, GHL\u2019s 13\/1\/25 motion on notice to set aside the ex-parte orders was not restricted to the Mareva Orders alone, but to all the orders contained in the ruling of 30\/12\/24, nor was it restricted to GHL alone; and, Dipeolu J ruled that GHL\u2019s motion was successful. The purport of the application being successful is that, every prayer in GHL\u2019s application was granted, that is, all 13 interim orders in the ex-parte order of 30\/12\/24 were set aside. Fourthly, it is pertinent to ask what Dipeolu J\u2019s intention was by delivering a confusing ruling, in an already controversial matter?! Lastly, if First Bank is dissatisfied, it is well within its right to appeal the January 29 ruling to the Court of Appeal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Onikepo.braithwaite@thisdaylive.com<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Onikepo Braithwaite GHL v FBN\/ FBN & Anor v GHL & Ors Subsequent upon the Ex-Parte Orders granted by Dehinde Dipeolu J. of the Federal High Court, Lagos Division on December 30, 2024 in Suit No: FHC\/L\/CS\/2378\/2024 First Bank Plc & Anor v GHL & Ors (ex-parte order(s)), GHL, and the 2nd-5th Defendant in this matter filed two […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":87890,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_hide_featured_image":false,"_jetpack_featured_image_duplicate_dismissed":0,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-88061","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-opinions"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t