A Review of Significant Decisions in Labour and Employment Matters

By Folabi Kuti SAN

Armed with the post-2011 constitutional mandate and an express directive to apply international best practices, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN) has continued to stretch its interpretative reach to confront the ever-shifting realities of the modern workplace. Declaring new frontiers of unfair labour practice, piercing corporate veils, upholding resignation rights, and condemning procedural shortcuts that once shielded employers, are just a few of some of the landmark decisions (in labour and employment) that were handed down in the course of the past year. In light of this, let us take a look at some of the most significant decisions, trends and developments in employment law in Nigeria, from 2025.

The ‘Limit’ of the Statute of Limitations in Industrial Matters

As a general rule, the position of the law is that where a claimant who once had a valid cause of action brings said action outside the statutorily prescribed limitation period, the action is statute barred. Essentially, this means that he loses his right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process. In the past, however, the courts made an exception for employment contracts and a few specified subject-matters. In Dr Moses Anolam v FUTO & Ors (2025) LPELR-80027 (SC), and Chukwuka Okoronkwo v. Independent National Electoral Commission (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131 – judgments of the Supreme Court delivered on January 17, 2025 (Anolam v FUTO), and 7^th February 2025 (Okoronkwo v INEC), the apex Court held that limitation laws, such as the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA) are in fact applicable to contracts of employment with statutory flavour, and consequently proceedings must be commenced or initiated within the 3-month period prescribed by the relevant law or statute, lest the action becomes statute-barred. Perhaps owing to the delayed reporting of the judgments, as well as the historically unsettled nature of this area (due to the apex court’s oscillating statements on the subject issue), the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN) was quite inconsistent in its early 2025 rulings. For example, in a few decisions made in first quarter of 2025, the Court applied the holding of the Supreme Court in cases such as National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (NRMA&FC) & 2 Others v. Ajibola Johnson & 10 Others (2019) 2 NWLR (Part 1656) 247, where the Supreme Court held that the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to employment contracts. A divergent view soon followed in later decisions, without reference to those decisions where the selfsame court had held differently. However, by the advent of the second quarter of the same 2025, the NIC had inexplicably upturned its position, holding instead that the limitation laws (for example, POPA), per the latest Supreme Court decisions of 2025 referenced above, now applies!

Weighing the rationale of the latest statement of the Supreme Court on the subject matter, the NICN, per Arowosegbe J in Anthonia Chiebonam Ekwo v INEC (Unreported Suit No. NICN/EN/04/2024; decision handed down on May 15, 2025),offered what appeared a ‘dissenting view at first instance’, as the Court’s approach was rather different. The Court identified a nuanced, critical distinction – not considered in the Supreme Court cases- when it posited that earlier POPA decisions were made before the Third Alteration of the CFRN (effective 4 March 2011), and that therefore, pre-2011 cases could not govern post-Third Alteration labour jurisprudence. Furthermore, by reasoning that it would be unfair to interpret a statute in a way that would run counter to labour and employment rights, the learned jurist argued that Section 254C(1)(f)–(h) & (2) CFRN (as amended) expressly empowers the NICN to enforce rights against unfair labour practices, international best practices, and international labour standards. These were described as “non-obstante provisions”, meaning that they even override conflicting statutes. Thus, laws that encourage unfair labour practices, like POPA’s rigid 3-month limit, cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. It was the Court’s position that Section 2(a) POPA, with its short limitation period, undermines access to justice and fair labour practice — contrary to international best standards(ILO). For additional context and clarity, the Lawlord further held that POPA was not meant to apply to contracts of service, as same was not expressly mentioned in POPA, and thus, could not be implied into it, and that when POPA’s three-month bar is tested against the doctrines of proportionality and fairness implicit in s.254(c) CFRN, it would necessarily be held as unreasonable, unfair, and disproportionate.

The first instance court’s engaging discussion of the inapplicability of POPA to employment contracts was further broadened in Dr. Mrs. Regina Eze v Federal Polytechnic, Obodo, Enugu State & Ors (Unreported Suit No. NICN/EN/13/2025; decision made December 19, 2025). Here, the elasticity of the emerging principle that employment-related cases are sui generis and guided by international best practices was further invoked, with the Court declaring that strict statutory requirements for pre-action notices were inapplicable to employment-related disputes.

In addition to a finding of a stale claim, the facts of Bishop Ewama Tuku & Anor v Nkrah Marine Ltd (Unreported Suit No. NICN/CA/04/2022; judgment delivered on 29^th April 2025; per Hon. Justice Sanusi Kado) provide considerable guidance on the invocation of the equitable doctrine of laches and acquiescence – an infrequently-deployed wicket in defence where a claimant is guilty of unreasonable delay in bringing an action.

The Inexhaustible List of Unfair Labour and Discriminatory Practices in the Modern Workplace

Throughout 2025, the Court expanded its catalogue on unfair labour and discriminatory practices by consistently ruling against all forms of discrimination, unilateral contract changes, prolonged non-payment of salary, withholding of pension, and a plethora of other unscrupulous practices. Judging by the results, it was undoubtedly a concerted effort to reduce oppressive conduct in the workplace.

In Mr. Olakunle Jagun v Airtel Networks Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/343/2023, judgement delivered on 2^nd October 2025; per Hon. Justice Joyce A.O. Damachi) the claimant explicitly invoked the (extra-layered) statutory duties on employers laid out by the Lagos State Special People’s Law, which provide for situations where an employee sustains or acquires a disability during employment. More pointedly, Section 44(7) of the legislation under reference provides that “No employee shall be relieved of his employment on the ground of disability sustained during his employment.” Here, the court found an instructive case for the application of the expansive protections afforded by S.34 of the Lagos State Special People’s Law, which notably includes (i) a statutory exception to the common law principle that a servant cannot be imposed on an unwilling master – namely, a statutory exception for employees with disabilities, mandating either retention, retraining or substantial severance benefits; (ii) where the latter applies, a severance package not less than 48 months’ salary if the disability permanently impedes the employee’s ability to discharge their duties; or a severance package not less than 60 months’ salary if the disability was sustained in the course of employment.

Here was a clear instance of both breach of the employment contract and unlawful discrimination against a protected class and accordingly, the court, in a well-argued passage of the judgment, noted thus: ‘The Law expressly prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of disability. The Defendant’s action in terminating the Claimant’s employment on grounds linked to his health condition i.e the wellness report amounts to discrimination-see S1.The Law mandates employers to guarantee equal opportunity in hiring, retention, and promotion of persons living with disabilities-S.28. The Defendant not only retained but commended the Claimant for his outstanding service (Exhibit C16). It is inequitable and unlawful to subsequently penalise him for the very condition that the law seeks to protect. Nigeria ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2007. Article 27 of the CRPD guarantees the right of persons with disabilities to work on an equal basis with others, including the right to retain employment in an open and inclusive labour market. Article 5 further obligates States to prohibit all forms of discrimination on the ground of disability. Once disability is established, the evidential burden shifts to the employer to show compliance with the statutory duties of fairness, non-discrimination, and accommodation. In the instant case, the Defendant has woefully failed to discharge this burden: no medical report was tendered, no incapacity leave granted, and no fair hearing given. The evidence before this Honourable Court establishes beyond controversy that the Claimant has, since 2007, lived with paraplegia requiring the use of a wheelchair. This fact was clearly observable by this Honourable Court during trial and was never challenged or contradicted by the Defendant’s witness. It is further reinforced by the Claimant’s medical history of having had 2 health challenges and the Defendant’s continued awareness of his condition throughout his seventeen (17) years of meritorious service. Despite this disability, the Claimant consistently excelled in his role. Exhibits C7 to C14 demonstrate positive performance appraisals over the years, culminating in a letter of commendation issued by the Defendant on 28th February 2022 (Exhibit C16). The Defendant’s reliance on “extended absence beyond 90 days” as the reason for termination must therefore be considered against this factual and legal backdrop.’ In line with the prescription in S.34 of the Lagos State Special People’s Law, the court held claimant entitled to N99,426,880 being special damages (60 months aggregate salary) for the termination of his employment. Not done, on the claim for exemplary damages, the court reasoned thus: ‘By a combination of Section 11 Labour Act (on termination procedure) and the Special People’s Law, the Defendant’s conduct is a breach of the employment contract AND unlawful discrimination against a protected class…More importantly, Section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 enjoins this Honourable Court to apply not only domestic law but also international best practices in labour law. Nigeria is a State Party to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (Convention No. 155). By ratifying this Convention, Nigeria has incorporated the principle that occupational safety and health is not a privilege but a fundamental right of workers.This Court, being clothed with the unique mandate of Section 7(6) NIC Act, is urged to interpret and enforce the law in light of these international best practices, so that the Claimant receives the full protection guaranteed under both Nigerian law and international labour standards. Compensating the Claimant isn’t just lawful, it’s part of Nigeria’s commitment under international treaties.’ The sum of ₦50,000,000 (Fifty Million Naira) was awarded for general and exemplary damages.

All said, it is pertinent to note – though not recorded to have been raised as a matter for determination in the case under reference – that the Lagos State House of Assembly lacks the legislative competence to enact the referenced provisions (Sections 23-38) of the Special People’s Law on matters touching on labour and employment, and/or attendant statutory protections as per severance benefits/package in the event of a disability sustained during employment. Labour, industrial relations and workplace safety/injury all fall squarely under the Exclusive Legislative List (Item 34, Part I, Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution), reserved – as its name suggests – exclusively for the National Assembly to legislate on. Thus, the specified items cannot stray into a concurrent list of shared legislative authority. As a matter of fact, the field has already been occupied by federal legislations, such as the Labour Act (Cap. F1 LFN 2004), Factories Act (Cap. F1 LFN 2004), and Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 which all, in some capacity, address the subject matter the claimant relied on the Lagos State Special People’s Law for. Flowing from that, the propriety of applying a state law in an area that has already been covered by valid federal enactments is doubtful, which appears to render the referenced provisions of the Lagos State Special People’s Law not merely constitutionally dubious, but outright redundant.

However, as the point was not raised before the court, it is understandable – in such an adversarial setting – that it received no judicial consideration. Nevertheless, the Lagos State House of Assembly appeared to have overreached in this instance, which should bring under much greater scrutiny in the coming years, the limits of state legislative power vis-à-vis matters reserved for federal regulation.

In an uncanny replay of the facts in Suit. No. NICN/LA/410/2019, Adewunmi Akinola v Ocean Marine Solutions Limited, a decision handed down by the NICN (per Hon. Justice I.G Nweneka) in 2021, the decision in Mr. Obiora Victor Emeka v Jaya Confectioneries Ltd & Anor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/348/2021, judgement delivered on 15^th May 2025; per Hon. Justice Ikechi Gerald Nweneka) again brought to the fore the gaps in many a (near-absent) workplace policy aimed at enabling an inclusive and supportive work environment for employees living with the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). Here, the claimant was offered a position as a customer service representative by the 1^st defendant. He eagerly accepted the job offer and consequently resigned from his former place of work. Upon accepting the offer, the 1st defendant required the claimant to complete a food handlers’ test at the 2^nd defendant’s facility before starting work. In compliance with this requirement, the claimant took the test, which included an HIV test that had not been previously mentioned. The test results were shared with the claimant and another individual without the claimant’s consent, leading to the revocation of his job offer.

Naturally, the claimant sued, claiming that he had faced discrimination based on health grounds, a breach of contract, and unauthorised communication of his HIV status by the 2^nd defendant, resulting in loss and damage. The 2nd defendant contested the claimant’s assertions, claiming that the claimant had consented to the sharing of the test results with the 1st defendant, while the 1st defendant contended that the revocation of the claimant’s job offer was due to his failure of the food handlers’ test.

Upon a calm consideration of the proven facts, the court granted the sought declaratory reliefs that: (i) mandating an HIV/AIDS test without claimant’s informed consent breached Sections 9[1] and [4] of the HIV/AIDS [Anti-Discrimination] Act, and of the National Guidelines for HIV Counselling and Testing, 2011. thus rendering it unlawful; (ii) the 1^st defendant’s oral revocation of the offer of employment made to the claimant on the basis of his real or perceived HIV status was in violation of Section 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [as amended], and Section 14[5] of the HIV and AIDS [Anti-Discrimination] Act, 2014, and therefore, was unconstitutional, discriminatory on the grounds of health status, and unlawful; and, (iii) that the 2nd defendant’s communication of the claimant’s HIV test result to the 1^st defendant and Olukemi Anazodo was in violation of Section 37 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [as amended] and Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and Section 13 of the HIV and AIDS [Anti-Discrimination] Act, 2014.

In light of the foregoing, the defendants’ actions were deemed to be unconstitutional, unlawful, and discriminatory on the grounds of health, and an infringement of the right to privacy. Consequently, the Court awarded special and general damages in favour of the claimant. For the specific damages, the Court held thus: ‘Given that the Claimant’s net salary was ₦66,673.33, I now award him the salary he would have earned for three years as general damages, totalling ₦2,400,239.88.’

In the case of Gabriel Odili v Digital Jewels Ltd (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/18/2021, judgement delivered on 2^nd October 2025; per Hon. Justice A.N Ubaka), the unilateral change of the terms and conditions of the claimant’s contract of employment, and the conversion of the same by the defendant from a regular contract of employment to a daily wage-paid contract, was deemed to be wrongful, a breach of contract, and an unfair labour practice.

Furthermore, in a similar vein, the non-payment of salaries and allowances for a continuous period of twenty-three (23) months, leading to the termination of the claimant’s employment was held to be unfair labour practice in Dr. Abidemi Taofeek Adesanya & Anor. v. Police Health Maintenance Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/37/2023, judgment delivered on 23^rd May, 2025; per Hon. Justice O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae). Still within a similar pattern, the deprivation of the claimant’s salaries for over six (6) years (Ibrahim M. Gidado v National Space Research & Development Agency (Unreported Suit No. NICN/KN/21/2024; judgment delivered on 21^st January, 2025; per Hon. Justice M.A Namtari) and seven (7) years (in Mr. Yannet Joshua v DAAR Communication Plc (Unreported Suit No. NICN/KN/34/2020; judgment delivered on 4^th February, 2025; per Hon. Justice M.A Namtari) was frowned upon, with the Court ordering the immediate payment of same, alongside general damages assessed at the equivalent of a year’s salary, in each of the cases.

In Shadrack M. Tenku v. Nigerian Postal Service & Anor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/373/2023, judgment delivered on 3^rd October, 2025; per Hon. Justice O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae), the Court held that the 1st defendant was not permitted to rely on the fact that the claimant had been dismissed from service as a reason to withhold his right to pension, where there was no law to that effect. Furthermore, the Court went on to hold that the withholding of the claimant’s pension was in violation of the claimant’s constitutional right to pension provided in Section 173 (2) of the 1999 Constitution, and the objectives expressly provided for in Section 1 of the Pension Reform Act 2014.

In the case of Mr. Gabriel Adeniran v JKN Ltd (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/297/2021, judgement delivered on 15^th May 2025; per Hon. Justice Ikechi Gerald Nweneka), the court held that the payment of ₦900,000.00 (Nine hundred thousand naira) to the claimant, as opposed to his actual retirement benefits of ₦21,897,260.62 (Twenty-one million, eight hundred and ninety-seven thousand two hundred and sixty Naira, sixty-two kobo), coupled with the attempted coercion of the claimant to accept same in extinguishment of his right to recover the balance of retirement benefits, was oppressive and constituted an unfair labour practice.

In a firm recognition of their statutory rights to privacy, the Court granted the declaration that the ‘continued use of the claimant’s personal biodata in form of images and pictures after leaving the employment of the defendants amounts to a gross violation of claimant’s personality right and fundamental right to privacy under section 37 CFRN 1999 as amended’ in Miss Franca Onu Daniel v Primetech Security Equipment Co. Ltd & Anor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/368/2024, judgment delivered on 17^th October, 2025, per Hon. Justice E.D Subilim), with compensatory damages in tow.

Expounding the consistent jurisprudence of the Court on the subject of prolonged, vindictive or indefinite suspension without pay, the Court in Mr. Uchelor Chibuzor Charles v Heritage Bank PLC (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/540/2018, judgement delivered on 11^th July 2025; per Hon. Justice (Prof) Elizabeth A. Oji) and Mr. Olatilewa Ajavi v Access Bank Plc (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/525/2015, judgement delivered on 21^st October 2025; per Hon. Justice (Prof) Elizabeth A. Oji), once againheld that the refusal and or failure of the defendant to pay salaries for work done when the claimant was put on what it termed ‘recovery suspension, is alien to both the Labour Law and the contract of service between the Claimant and the Defendant, and therefore null, void and out-rightly illegal. ‘

The wrongfulness of an indefinite suspension without pay of the defendant for a whole period of 68 months was also examined in Melrose Books & Publishing Limited v Mr. Babalola Adekunle (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/279/2017, judgement delivered on 17^th July 2025; per Hon. Justice (Prof) Elizabeth A. Oji).

Relatedly, in Mr. Rasheed Jimoh v. Dee-Pee Global Packaging Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/30/2022, judgment delivered on 13^thJanuary, 2025; per Hon. Justice J.D. Peters) the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant – which had lasted over one year and eight months and counting without payment of salary – was held to have amounted to a wrongful determination of the claimant’s appointment and an unfair labour practice.

Early and Otherwise Wrongful Termination of Contracts

Over the course of the year-in-review, the Courts ruled mostly against premature or procedurally flawed terminations, especially in public-sector and statutory-flavoured roles. The Courts repeatedly struck down employer attempts to invoke policy or other excuses to oust workers, particularly where the employees bore no fault, with some decisions protecting accrued benefits even post-resignation.

It is currently January of 2026, the first month in the new year, which, going by the holding of the NICN in Dr. Christopher Vershima Ashekaa v National Assembly Service Commission & 2 Ors, (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ANJ/455/2024; judgment delivered on 11^th November 2025; per Hon. Justice B.B. Kanyip, Ph.D., OFR, PNICN), the claimant therein would only then have clocked eight (8) years on the post as Director (Legislative) in the National Assembly. Thus, it was only then, and not 1 January 2025 (as he had been wrongly and prematurely retired), that he was due for retirement. The crux of the decision was focused on the statutory exit date, going by the eight-year tenure of Directors envisaged by Public Service Rule 020909. The claimant argued that his 2017 notional appointment to the post of Director (Legislative) should not count as a start date, as he did not “serve on the post” and enjoyed no financial or other benefits (until 1 January 2018 – the actual promotion date), and as such, his retirement ought to be January 2026.

In consonance with previous decisions of the Court on the subject matter, the Court held that the fact of “notional promotion” could not be factored in for the purpose of computing eight (8) years in the application of the eight-year compulsory retirement rule applicable to the claimant as a Director. The Court reiterated its position on the matter – namely, that those on notional promotion, who were not yet enjoying any financial benefit from the notional promotion, could not be said to have been promoted to their benefit. Where an employer wished to factor the period of notional promotion for the purposes of applying the eight-year tenure rule, it must have borne the full financial burden of the promotion by paying all salaries and allowances inuring to the employee for the period of the notional promotion.

In Moses Ambakina Jibotoh v Police Service Commission (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/274/2023, judgement delivered on 13^th January 2025; per Hon. Justice O.A Obaseki-Osaghae) the matter concerned a ‘policy statement’ veiled as ‘public interest’, requiring the compulsory retirement of senior officers upon the appointment of their junior as Inspector-General of Police. This policy, which effectively terminated the claimant’s appointment as Deputy Inspector-General of Police before the statutory mandatory retirement age, was trenchantly exposed to be in violation of the letters of the Public Service Rules and the Nigeria Police Act 2020, respectively, and was consequently set aside. The Court held in favour of the claimant and ordered his reinstatement into the Force, with payment of salaries, allowances, and the other prerequisites of office. Furthermore, to assuage the embarrassment, pain, and stigma caused by the wrongful action of the defendant, the Court awarded the sum of ₦50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as general damages.

In the case of Sunday Nyam Bot & 4 Ors. v. Nigeria Christian Pilgrims Commission (NCPC). (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/69/2024, judgment delivered on 19^th February, 2025; per Hon. Justice B.B. Kanyip, Ph.D., OFR, PNICN), the Court frowned at the defendant’s attempt to justify the withdrawal of the claimants’ appointments a mere four (4) months into their two-year term-certain contracts on the grounds of non-compliance with the federal character principle. The NCPC’s argument (that it had withdrawn the appointments due to this later-discovered irregularity) was not countenanced in the context of the instant case. The Court held that, as the claimants were in no way responsible for the alleged non-compliance, any such irregularity stemmed entirely from the employer’s own failings, and the claimants could not be punished for the same.

In a similar vein, applying the law to the declared facts in Ajiji Azi Nyako & 5 Ors. v Governor of Plateau State & 2 Ors (Unreported Suit No.NICN/JOS/47/2024; judgment delivered on 10^th December 2025, per Hon. Justice I.S Galadima), the court intuited that “The key point raised is that the respondents have not demonstrated that any purported breach of the recruitment procedures was attributable to the applicants rather than to themselves. That omission brings into focus both culpability and the applicants’ constitutional right to a fair hearing. If the applicants simply benefited from a defective process devised or overseen by the respondents or their agents, it would be fundamentally unjust to punish them without showing they were directly involved in, or aware of, any impropriety… Since the respondents have failed to show any connection between the applicants and the alleged procedural lapses, they have not put forward a valid basis for holding the applicants personally responsible. It is true that defects in appointment procedures may invalidate an appointment, but the party challenging must not only prove those defects, but—if it wishes to take adverse measures against the appointees—also demonstrate that the appointees were aware of or complicit in them.”

Even in cases where appointments are found to be irregular due to procedural defects, the employer cannot unilaterally terminate the contracts without following the agreed-upon terms or due process. This is doubly so where the employees have already rendered services, as held in Gobel Joseph Gogwin & 46 Ors. v Plateau State Contributory Health Care Management Agency (PLACHEMA) & Anor (Unreported Suit No NICN/JOS/19/2024; judgment delivered 10^th December 2025; per Hon. Justice I.S Galadima), where such defects were held not to negate the fact of the employer’s consequential brazen actions. In that case, the suspension, non-payment, and termination without notice or pay of the claimant’s employment were held to constitute a breach of the existing contractual terms.

In Dr. Femi Zacchaeus Ogunlade v. Corporate Affairs Commission & Anor. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/336/2024, judgment delivered on 24^th July, 2025; per Hon. Justice E.D. Subilim) the court held that the claimant was entitled to arrears of salary, gratuity and other perks of office appurtenant to a delayed promotion exercise whose result was only released 13 months after the claimant had resigned. The court held that the, ‘claimant can still benefit from his accrued promotion due to him after resignation from the employment of the 1^st Defendant within the time he remains in service before exiting.’ Arguably of a similar fact-pattern, the court in Olumide Ologe v Corporate Affairs Commission & Anor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/375/2024, judgment delivered on 12^th March 2025; per Hon. Justice O.Y Anuwe) held, differently, and stated that ‘where he had resigned before the promotion was approved, the claimant cannot claim for salary or benefits from the employment that had ceased to exist’.

Disciplining Within the Workplace Without Getting Disciplined by the Law

Over the year, the Courts repeatedly emphasised that employers (particularly those in the public sector) could not discipline or terminate staff without strict adherence to proper procedure. Courts struck down terminations for alleged misconduct where no proper investigative committee was convened, or statutory steps were followed, declaring them wrongful and unlawful. Notwithstanding the age-old principle of the impropriety of foisting a willing servant on an unwilling master, reinstatement and nullification of adverse actions became the norm when employers acted unilaterally or bypassed due process.

Foreshadowing the intent of the wording of section 18 of the University of Lagos Act (UNILAG Act) (originally Section 17 of the University of Lagos Act 1967, as amended), which came up for interpretation in the cause célèbre Olaniyan v University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 2) 599 at 680, the decision in Mr. Bamisaye Olawale Olutola v University of Lagos (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/441/2021, judgement delivered on 17^th July 2025; per Hon. Justice Ikechi Gerald Nweneka) similarly considered the propriety of purportedly determining the claimant’s employment.

Here, the Court considered whether the claimant was validly terminated, whether in his capacity as a permanent staff member (having been impliedly confirmed, as argued by the claimant and accepted by the Court), or as a probationer (the University’s defence), without adhering to the procedures outlined in the Regulations and the University of Lagos Act. This was particularly relevant,especially due to the fact that no Senate Committee was established to investigate any alleged misconduct against him. The Court held the termination to be inconsistent with the terms of the employment contract and thus wrongful. The Court also held the said termination unlawful for its non-adherence to the strict stipulations and prescriptions of paragraph 15 of the Regulations, clauses 6 and 7 of the memorandum of appointment; and Section 18 of the University of Lagos Act.

Section 18 of the UNILAG Act resonated yet again (within the year under review) in Dr. Mojibayo Mobolaji Fadakinte v University of Lagos and 3 Ors. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/322/2022; judgment delivered on 3^rd December 2025, per Hon. Justice R.H Gwandu). Here, the claimant was an academic staff member (Senior Lecturer) in the University when the defendants asserted that the claimant had reached the mandatory retirement age of 65 years on 17 May 2020, having been born on 18 March 1955. This information was accessed from his undergraduate and postgraduate student records with the University. It was argued that the claimant’s subsequent reliance on 18 March 1958 as his date of birth was inconsistent with his academic records and therefore unacceptable. Furthermore, the University had received a petition alleging age discrepancy, prompting internal correspondence requesting the claimant to clarify the inconsistencies. The claimant was said to have failed to respond within a reasonable time and, when he eventually responded, provided no explanation for the discrepancy. Consequently, the University compulsorily retired him.

Naturally, the claimant instituted the action challenging the retirement, alleging violation of fair hearing and seeking reinstatement. The University argued that compliance with the provisions of Section 18 of the UNILAG Act was not necessary when handling the claimant’s case, as the allegation of falsification of age did not amount to ‘misconduct’ as contemplated within the said provision of the establishment’s statute. However, the Court held differently. In its finding, the Court held that ‘falsification is and has always been a serious criminal offence punishable under Nigerian Laws. It also must be considered a misconduct in the 1st Defendant if it warrants immediate retirement of the Claimant for it would have meant the Claimant not only criminally misrepresented his age but also falsified documents to prove same’. In addition to this, by identifying the subsequent flawed step taken (in not adhering to the minutia provided in the section 18 of UNILAG Act), that ‘The Defendants have not shown the Court that they adhered to these mandatory provisions, the Law is clear on the steps on removing a staff of the 1st Defendant and the 4th Defendant cannot unilaterally usurp the powers of the Senate and Council of the University of Lagos, in being accuser, investigator and Judge.’ The said compulsory retirement was set aside, even as the prayer for reinstatement could not be granted on account of additional finding that employment now deemed to have come to an end when claimant reached the approved age of retirement on attaining 65 years of age in May of 2023.

In Dr. Mathias A. Nnadi v Rivers State University of Science and Technology (Unreported Suit No. NICN/YEN/22/2017, judgement delivered on 2^nd October 2025; per Hon. Justice Z.M. Bashir, PHD), the Court took on a similar question of termination of the claimant without strict compliance with the University’s establishment law and regulations governing the conditions of service. In the said case, the Court made an order of reinstatement in favour of the claimant, which provides yet another instance where the purported termination of the claimant was reversed for not following the Regulations Governing the conditions of service.

In Emmanuel Kayode Adebisi v Kwara State University & Anor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/AK/09/2019; judgment delivered on 20^th March 2025; per Hon. Justice K.D Damulak) the allegation that the claimant was not afforded an opportunity to present his case in person before the University Governing Council before and after he was relieved of his appointment (on allegation of extortion and sexual harassment), contrary to the stipulation of the University Regulations on conditions of service, was not borne out of the pleadings and evidence before the Court. The Court held that the same, being one within the realm of facts, could not be made for the first time via the claimant’s final address.

On Voluntary Resignation from the Armed Forces

In 2025, the Courts repeatedly upheld resignation rights across the Armed Forces, even extending the principle to voluntary retirement in civil service contexts, where employers could no longer dismiss post-resignation.

In Tsaro Igbara Tuamene Godswill v The Chief of Air Staff & Anor. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/364/2024, judgment delivered on 4^th March 2025; per Hon. Justice B.B. Kanyip, Ph.D., OFR, PNICN) the NICN answered the question of the right of the claimant to voluntarily resign from the service of the defendants in the affirmative. Here, the resolution involved a calm consideration of relevant provisions of Section 306 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999); the Armed Forces Act No. 105 of 1993 and a previous case law citation on the same subject-issue.

Similar verdicts to the resolution (stated in the immediate foregoing paragraph) were reached in the cases of Dr. Michael Ikuesan v The Chief of Naval Staff & Anor. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/18/2025, judgment delivered on 8^th May 2025; per Hon. Justice B.B. Kanyip, Ph.D., OFR, PNICN); Nnaemezie Dim v. The Chief of Army Staff & Anor. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/223/2024, judgment delivered on 27^th May, 2025; per Hon. Justice E.D. Subilim); Akerele Adedoyin Jeremiah v. The Chief of Air Staff & Anor. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/25/2025, judgment delivered on 2^nd September, 2025; per Hon. Justice E.D. Subilim) andDr Abubakar Gidado Halilu v The Chief of Naval Staff & Anor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/112/2024, judgment delivered on 13^th November 2025; per Hon. Justice B.B. Kanyip, Ph.D., OFR, PNICN).

The NICN also applied the same rule of resignation to voluntary retirement for which the employer (Civil Service) could not thereafter purport to exercise right to dismiss from service in Engr. Raimi Olayiwola Aminu v The Chairman, Ondo State Civil Service Commission & 4 Ors. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/AK/11/2024, judgment delivered on 5^thDecember, 2025; per Hon. Justice K.D Damulak)

Whilst the right to resign is held to be immutable, Infinity Security Services v. Paul Irabor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/398/2022, judgment delivered on 11^th March, 2025; per Hon. Justice O.Y. Anuwe), provided for the remedy of the employer who is given less than the notice-period indicated in the agreement of parties.

On bonds and the threshold of reasonability

In 2025, the Courts dealt extensively with the enforceability of service bonds and other forms of post-employment restraints, particularly in light of how to balance employer interests in protecting its investments against worker mobility. While the Court of Appeal controversially upheld a 5-year non-compete for the first time, NICN rulings enforced reasonable bonds for training costs with damages for breaches, but struck down restraints that were unduly restrictive or predatory.

The Court of Appeal decision in The La Casera Company Plc v Mr. Prahlad Kottappurath Ganghadaran (unreported Appeal No. CA/L/1059/2016, judgment delivered on the 9^th of July 2025), reignited critical debate on the doctrine of restraint of trade and the potential width of its proper application within the context of employment relationships in Nigeria. The decision, which reversed in part the earlier finding of the lower court, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN), in the similarly unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/533/13 delivered on the 17^th of March, 2016, raised important questions on the limits of contractual freedom and the protection of legitimate business interests, in line with the presumptive expectation of worker protection.

The settled orthodoxy is that post-employment restraints extending beyond 2 or 3 years are almost invariably struck down as being unenforceable and contrary to public policy. However, in the La Casera’scase, for the first time and without providing any reasoning or structured, analytical discussion to either explain or justify its departure, the Court of Appeal held that a 5-year trade or work restriction (in the employment law space) was valid and enforceable. In addition to the marked shift from settled jurisprudence, it was further remarkable that the Court of Appeal in La Casera failed to engage with the legislative position now codified under Section 68(1)(e) of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2018 which represents the clearest reflection of modern public policy on restrictive covenants in Nigeria. It provides that a contract of service may include post-employment restrictions, provided that “…this period shall not be more than two years…” For clarity, the legislative intervention in Section 68(1)(e) of the FCCPC Act now provides a maximum of 2 years restriction for any restrictive covenant/contract in the employment law space.

Still within the bracket of a 5-year restriction to career mobility, in Dr Abubakar Gidado Halilu v The Chief of Naval Staff & Anor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/112/2024, judgment delivered on 13^th November 2025; per Hon. Justice B.B. Kanyip, Ph.D., OFR, PNICN),the defendants argued that the claimant who had been sponsored for a training in the United Kingdom, cannot voluntarily retire/resign from the Nigerian Navy without complying with Paragraph 03.12 of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), which provides thus: ‘Any officer sponsored by any of the services or released on sponsorship (including self- sponsorship) for any course, military or civil, lasting up to a session of 9 months shall not be allowed to proceed on voluntary retirement or resign his appointment within 3 years from the completion of the course except on recommendation by his Service Chief and approved by his Service Council/Board. Where the course lasts more than one session, the period of debarment from resignation or retirement shall be 5 years. This provision does not apply to Officers on resettlement pending retirement.’

Referencing the ratio from its earlier decision in Overland Airways Ltd v. Captain Raymond Jam [2015] 62 NLLR (Pt. 219) 525 where the court held that reasonability is determined by considering factors like the duration of the bonding period, how slavish or restrictive the covenants are, the Court (in Halilu v Chief of Naval Staff) held the debarment from resignation or retirement for 5 years as unreasonable especially so as the said training was sponsored by a third party with the defendants merely giving permission to undertake the Ph.D. program.

In Ashbard Energy Company Ltd & Anor v Mr. Jeremiah Agbarakwe (Unreported Suit No. NICN/PHC/39/2022, judgement delivered on 11^th February 2025; per Hon. Justice N.C.S Ogbuanya), the 1^st claimant company arranged an overseas training program in Spain for the defendant, and executed a Service Bond Agreement with him to that effect. Per the terms of the Agreement, the defendant undertook not to leave the employ of the 1^st claimant upon being sponsored for the training until after three years. However, in the event that the defendant chose to leave notwithstanding the agreement, he undertook to pay the sum of ₦3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira), being the sum spent for his training by the 1^st claimant.

Upon his return, the Defendant did not dispute the quality of the training he had received, but later resigned (within 3 months of return from the said training program) without regard to the terms of the employment and the service bond executed by the parties. Furthermore, he did not give the requisite one-month notice of intention to disengage as contained in his contract, neither did he leave a handover note. Naturally, the defendant was held to his bargain, and the service bond was held enforceable.

Upon evaluation of the proven facts before the Court, the Court held that the way and manner in which the defendant terminated his employment with the 1^st claimant without service of notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice as stipulated in the contract of employment was wrongful, and constituted an unfair labour practice. The Court further held that the defendant’s act of leaving the 1^st claimant company before the 3-year stipulated duration, while failing to pay the sum of ₦3,000,000.00, representing the cost of his training, was an act of manifest breach of the Service Bond. Overall, and to assuage the wrongdoing, the defendant was thus ordered to pay to the 1^st claimant company: (i) the sum of ₦180,000.00 (One Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira), being the Defendant’s one-month salary in lieu of notice, for this termination of the contract of employment with the 1^st Claimant Company by way of resignation with immediate effect, without serving the stipulated one-month notice or paying the salary in lieu of notice; (ii) the sum of ₦3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira), representing the cost of the training undergone in Spain; (iii) the sum of ₦2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) as compensation by way of general damages, arising from the defendant’s breach of his employment contract and service bond without regard to proper handover of his duty before resigning abruptly without informing the claimants; and (iv) costs in the sum of ₦1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira).

On the primacy of the facts, it is also noteworthy that the Court did not direct that the refund of the bond sum be prorated to reflect the period the defendant spent in the claimant’s employment upon his return from training (as the courts have done in related instances). This is quite notable. Although the defendant remained with the claimant for around three months post-training, the Court appears to have treated this duration as contractually negligible, and insufficient to warrant any fragmentation or apportionment of the ₦3,000,000.00 training cost. By way of additional commentary, on the application of a balancing principle, the premature resignation (in stark disregard to the terms of the service bond), coming so shortly after the completion of the sponsored training, was rightly characterised as a total breach rather than a partial one. While a substantially longer period of post-training service might, in appropriate cases, justify a prorated refund, a three-month tenure, against a stipulated commitment of three years, tantamount to no meaningful performance at all.

In the related case of Ladoke Akintola University of Technology v. Dr. Adewale Taiwo Olaumboye & Anor. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/76/2021, judgment delivered on 16^th July, 2025; per Hon. Justice J.D. Peters) the employer-claimant was successful in binding the employee-defendant to a reasonably made bond. The court found a cogent and acceptable case that ‘the 1^st Defendant by refusal to resume work with the Claimant following conclusion of his PHD programme during which the Defendant was paid his salary whilst on leave, the Claimant is entitled to refund of total salary paid to the 1^st Defendant during the PHD programme by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants in line with terms of the Bond to the tune of the total salary paid from August, 2014 till November, 2018 amounting to N8,169,250.28k (Eight Million, One Hundred an d Sixty-Nine Thousand, Two Hundred and Fifty Naira, Twenty-Eight Kobo only)’

The Court in Windowstory Nig. Ltd v Mr. Peter J. Ayuba (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/454/2024, judgment delivered on 10^th December, 2025; per Hon. Justice E.D Subilim), refused the claimant’s prayer for the court to restrain the defendant (a former employee) from engaging “in the claimant’s trade or taking employment with companies engaged in the claimant’s trade/business or in competition with the claimant for a period of three years”. Here, the court held that clauses seeking to restrain post-employment disclosure (otherwise known as the use of the company’s trade secrets), without properly proving the existence or misuse of any such secrets, were unreasonable and unenforceable.

In Landmark University v Prof. Adedoyin Isola Lawal (Unreported Suit No. NICN/IL/03/2023, judgment delivered on 4^th December, 2025; per Hon. Justice K.D Damulak), the Court declared that, on the proven facts before it, the defendant was not in breach of the bond agreement with the claimant. The remedy in this instance was a consequential order for the immediate release of the defendant’s certificate, which had been wrongfully withheld by the claimant. On the withholding of the certificate, the court further held that seizure or withholding of an employee’s educational certificates as security for any agreement constitutes an unfair labour practice.

Relatedly, in the case of Bartholomew Chinedu Eze v Greenlife Pharmaceuticals Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/287/2021, judgement delivered on 5^th March 2025; per Hon. Justice (Dr.) I.J. Essien), the Court addressed the return of an original educational certificate that the claimant had been required to submit as a condition of employment. The suit, initiated in 2016 and involving a termination from 2020, squarely raised and called into question the propriety of employers insisting on the submission of original educational certificates as a precondition for employment.

Triangular Employment: Primacy of Facts or Abstract-Doctrinal?

2025 was the year of piercing the corporate veil, where the Courts attempted to formulate an acceptable version of triangular employment, while sidestepping strict adherence to privity of contract when necessary, in an effort to properly identify the real liability within this historically abusive triangular employment structure.

Making a cogent case for the existence of (an emerging) labour jurisprudence recognising a model of triangular employment in the modern world of work, the peculiar facts of Catherine Erenini v. Integrated Corporate Services Ltd. & Anor. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABK/11/2022, judgment delivered on 31^st January, 2025; per Hon. Justice O.O Arowosegbe) provided an opportunity to distinguish and depart from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Luck Guard Limited v Adariku & Ors. In the latter case, the Court of Appeal relied on the strict doctrine of privity of contract to hold that no employment relationship existed between the claimant/respondent and the defendant/appellant. In the present case, where the court pierced the veil to find a triangular relationship between the co-employers (the 2^nd defendant as the real employer of the claimant while the 1^st was a mere recruiter), the court rightly relied on the relevant provisions of the Court’s establishment statute to bypass any such principles of common law doctrine, capable of being leveraged to perpetuate industrial relations fraud and injustice. The court held, in part, ‘The NIC thus has the jurisdictional competence and the power to lawfully interfere with the common law doctrine of privity in pertinent occasions. And I hold that this occasion is one of such. Therefore, wherever it is established that to uphold privity of contract, a worker would suffer the fate of not being able to enforce any of his/her employment rights, that is an indication that the doctrine of privity must be pierced.’

Not allowing the veil of incorporation to shield the liability/obligations that attend upon same, the case of James Nwagbogwu Ebede v Exxon Mobil Corporation & Anor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/22/2018, judgement delivered on 28^th March 2025; per Hon. Justice R.H. Gwandu) is yet another instructive decision in which the court found a triangular employment between the defendants for the employment of the claimant, despite the protestation of the 1^st defendant to the contrary. The case concerned, in the main, allegations of workplace bullying/harassment culminating in the claimant’s forced retirement (which the Court found to amount to constructive dismissal), as well as the unlawful detention of the claimant’s family properties. As a result, the court awarded the sum of $1,000,000 (One Million US Dollars (against the defendants) to the claimant as “general damages for the emotional distress, mental torture, public embarrassment, trauma, inconvenience, racial discrimination and loss of job prospects which the claimant suffered as a result of the actions of the defendants.”

Now while the factual findings of workplace bullying, constructive dismissal and the wrongful detention of the claimant’s properties provide a compelling basis for liability, the decision is still likely to generate a renewed critique as to the new wave of high watermark compensatory damages in employment-related claims. If we closely examine the judgement, although the claimant succeeded in establishing the acts complained of, and was awarded specific reliefs (including special damages) accordingly, the grant of US$1,000,000.00 as general damages for emotional distress, mental torture, public embarrassment, etc. (which, one would very quickly admit, are generic descriptors bearing same meaning) should invite closer scrutiny.

Without detracting from the seriousness of the wrongs established, the case raises a legitimate concern as to whether, and to what extent, prudential guidelines ought to inform the assessment of general damages in such cases. The intention here is not to suggest rigid or inflexible rules, but discernable benchmarks to promote consistency and proportionality, above all else. As it stands however, there remains an open question as to whether an award of this magnitude, grounded largely in what can only be described as ‘non-pecuniary loss’, would withstand appellate review, particularly in the absence of clearly articulated parameters, or precedent, for evaluating such a value.

Union(ism) – To Be, or Not to Be; and Matters Incidental.

One could argue that the overarching themes for Trade Union Law in 2025 were voluntarism, plurality, and international best practices. The following judgments lend credence to that suggestion.

The main crux of claimant’s case in Comrade Alex Abu (for himself and on behalf of all sectoral units (parastatals) of Nigeria Union of Pensioners v Registrar of Trade Unions & 2 Ors (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/540/2019, judgement delivered on 21^st October 2025; per Hon. Justice (Prof) Elizabeth A. Oji) was a challenge on whether the Registrar of Trade Unions could lawfully register another trade union to cater for the interests of Pensioners when there already existed another trade union serving the same purpose. The Court took an admirable review of the selfsame court’s position on NICN’s acceptance of ILO-accepted principles of trade union plurality, as opposed to a trade union monopoly, except where the workers themselves expressed preference for a trade union monopoly. Furthermore, the Court went on to hold that any statutory (including constitutional) provisions prohibiting the creation of more than one trade union for a given occupation or economic category; or a law which does not authorise the establishment of a second union in an enterprise or requires a single union for each enterprise, trade or occupation; or any law whose object is the prevention of two enterprise trade unions coexisting, all fail to comply with Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 87.

Still within the latitude of voluntarism and trade union membership/activity, the panel decision in Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria v. Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Association & 2 Ors. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/189/2023, judgment delivered on 11^thJune, 2025; per Hon. Justice O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae (presiding judge), Hon. Justice R.B. Haastrup, Hon. Justice S.O. Adeniyi) and National Union Of Hotels And Personal Services Workers v National Union of Air Transport Employees (unreported) Suit No: NICN/ABJ/39/2023 delivered on 6^th February, 2025 affirmed the exercise of the right to belong to new trade unions within the jurisdictional scope of old unions already empowered to operate within that scope.

The court in Sir Timothy Amobi Nwosu v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/EN/54/2019, judgment delivered on 20^th June, 2025; per Hon. Justice O.O Arowosegbe) held that non-union workers could take advantage of collective bargaining agreements negotiated by unions to cover a class of workers. The Court considered the applicability of ILO Conventions 29, 052, 105 and 132 in concluding that leave (that is, time taken off work) was compulsory, and that these provisions override any inconsistent clauses and conditions of service. The court poignantly noted that, ‘The international best practice in this regard is as ensconced in the ILO C132 – Holidays with Pay Convention, 1970 (No. 132) and applicable in Nigeria by virtue of S. 7(6) of the NICA. Art 1 of the ILO C132 says, the Convention is enforceable by collective agreements, court decisions and, through local legislations. The local legislation mandate is met by S. 18 of the LA while the collective agreement mandate is met by the CA in question and S. 7(1)(c) of the NICA combined and the court mandate is met by the NIC specially created to apply international best practices. And the implication is that, where even the CA clashes with these ILOConventions or the LA, it would be void to that extent, as the ILO Conventions have statutory flavour by virtue of S. 7(6) of the NICA. Let me mention immediately that, where the issue of international best practices is involved, the question of ratification and domestication of the conventions or instruments grounding international best practices does not arise.

All that matters is that the particular convention is a mirror of international best practices, which all ILO Conventions are, by reason of ILO conventions being the synthetised aggregates of consensus of practices around the world in the particular areas of labour relations covered. This is more so because ILO Conventions are drafted by world body of tripartite members, representing labour, employers and government, with the advice of labour law publicists of highest standard, drawn from across the world, and the drafts are subsequently adopted by the General Assembly comprising representatives of virtually all countries of the world. So, the first place to search for international best labour practices, is the ILO conventions.’

With regards to industrial action, the case of Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB) & Anor v Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) & 3 Ors (Unreported Suit No. NICN/YL/10/2024, judgement delivered on 20^th February 2025; per Hon. Justice P.I. Hamman) emphasised the mandatory preconditions that must be met before any employee, worker or aggrieved party can declare or take part in a lock-out or strike.

National Pensions Commission (PENCOM) v. The Contributory Pensioners Union of Nigeria (CPUN) (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/352/2017, judgment delivered on 8^thMay, 2025; per Hon. Justices O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae; Anuwe; and, Adeniyi) amplifies the strict prescription of trade dispute that can warrant a reference to the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP), and/or adjudication by the IAP.

In Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) v Bida Local Government Council & Anor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/MN/53/2024, judgment delivered on 2^nd December, 2025; per Hon. Justice O.Y Anuwe), the Court stretched an oft-overlooked point in the interpretation of the relevant provision of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 (CAMA) concerning the permitted operations of associations registered as Incorporated Trustees. The court adopted a liberal reading of CAMA to permit incorporated trustees to register members and collect dues (even for revenue generation), without crossing into the otherwise prohibited trade union territory.

The claimant’s main grievance was that the 2^nd defendant, not being a registered trade union, carried out trade union activities similar to those of the claimant, within the 1^st defendant’s Local Government. Specifically, the 2^nd defendant was registering commercial motorcycle riders and collecting dues realised from the sale of registration stickers, ID cards, and tickets from commercial motorcycle riders. The claimant contended that by virtue of sections 823(1) and 825(1)(b) of CAMA, the 2^nd defendant, as a non-profit-making association, could not operate a profitable venture or business by way of registering and collecting dues from riders (off the back of blatant commercialisation).

Adopting a purposively liberal interpretation of the relevant provisions of CAMA, the Court held that, from the construction of the provisions, there was nothing that said an association so registered as a Trustee must be strictly non-profit-making in all respects. By the said token of reasoning, there was nothing in the provisions that precluded such an association from registering its members, collecting dues, or even selling relevant association items such as registration stickers, ID cards, and tickets to its members to generate income.

Workplace Injury, Compensatory Damages, Discrimination In the World of Work on the Basis of Disability, Etc.

Over the course of 2025, the Courts consistently affirmed that workplace injury was a matter beyond mere accident, demanding the employer compensate the aggrieved employee appropriately. This area also saw a particularly notable uptick in the quantum of damages, marking the Court’s awareness of the ever-weakening currency and inflated cost of living.

In the case of Essien Mimbala v Bouygues Construction Nigeria Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/PHC/139/2022, judgement delivered on 16^th July 2025; per Hon. Justice Z.M. Bashir, PHD),the court held that the defendant’s act of saddling the claimant with additional duties beyond his contractual duties as a gardener, for which he was employed, without a corresponding increase in his salaries and allowances, was unlawful, oppressive, and amounted to an unfair labour practice. The claimant was also successful on the sought declaratory reliefs that (i) the act of the defendant which exposed the claimant to have primary contact with a COVID-19-infected expatriate staff of the defendant in the course of his employment, and thereby infected the claimant with COVID-19, was inhuman, dehumanizing, and constituted an unfair labour practice; and, (ii) that the act of the defendant in quarantining the claimant in his one-room apartment at his place of work, after he contracted COVID-19 at his place of work and in the course of his employment, without providing adequate medical care and support, was inhuman, dehumanizing, oppressive and constituted an unfair labour practice. Here, the court awarded the claimant the sum of ₦2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) as general damages.

Taking into consideration the2^nd defendant’s breach of their duty of care, along with all the other circumstances in the case of Gbenga Dada v. 200 Stars Resources Limited (Plastics Division) (Formally Ladox Plastics Products Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/44/2019, judgment delivered on 21^stOctober, 2025; per Hon. Justice J.D. Peters), which led to the loss of a limb of the claimant in an industrial accident, the Court awarded the claimant the sum of ₦20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) only against the 2^nd defendant. This stemmed from the injury sustained by the claimant in the course of his employment (as a factory worker) for the 2^nd Defendant. However, the quantum of the damages awarded in this instance owes itself in part to the current value of the Nigerian Naira, as the decision represents an upward climb in awards of damages for industrial injury cases. This trend is repeated in all the following cases.

In the related case of Ibrahim Isah v. Xinfeng Plastic Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/397/2023, judgment delivered on 3^rd June, 2025; per Hon. Justice E.D. Subilim), the defendant’s negligence led to the amputation of the claimant’s arm, which resulted in the loss of his amenities of life, expectations of life and future earnings. Furthermore, it was discovered that the claimant’s injury occurred as a result of his being coerced to operate the highly technical and complex washing machine outside the purview of his work and without prior training in handling of same. The defendant’s failure to provide adequate training and protection tools for such an otherwise dangerous task meant that when the machine gripped his hand, he was grievously injured. To further compound their wrongdoing, the defendant was also negligent when it failed to provide adequate medical treatment for the claimant’s injuries, which exposed the injuries he sustained to infections and complications, which ultimately resulted in the amputation of his arm. Here, the sum of ₦15,000,000.00 (Fifteen Million Naira) was awarded as damages for the claimant, in view of the suffering, injury, loss of expectation of life and future loss of earnings.

On a comparative note, in Miss Ogechi Nwachukwu v Beloxxy Industry Ltd (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/30/2024, judgement delivered on 24^th August 2025; per Hon. Justice S.A. Yelwa), the claimant had all her fingers intact when she was employed by the defendant as a casual worker. Upon operating the defendant’s machine as instructed however, an industrial accident occurred, resulting in the loss of two index fingers. Due to the defendant’s breach of the duty of care owed to the claimant, an award of ₦10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) was given to her as compensation for the injury she sustained.

Interestingly however, in Mr. James Owolabi v Amazia Manufacturing Ltd (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/275/2023, judgement delivered on 29^th April 2025; per Hon. Justice Joyce A.O. Damachi) the claimant was held entitled to, and was awarded the sum of ₦6,500,000.00 as compensation for the permanent loss of his 2 fingers on his right hand, resulting from injury sustained due to the negligence of the defendant.

Viewed comparatively, these two decisions once more bring into focus the ever-recurring question of consistency and proportionality in the award of compensatory damages in employment disputes. In both cases, the claimants suffered severe, but materially similar injuries, namely the permanent loss of two fingers. In both cases, said injuries arose from the employers’ breach of duty of care. Despite this, the quantum of compensation awarded differed significantly. While the facts and surrounding circumstances of each case may justify some degree of judicial discretion, such a wide disparity certainly reiterates the growing need for prudential guidelines to inform the assessment of damages in workplace injury claims.

More severely, as espoused in the facts of Osanyingbemi Ayobami Samson v Goodwill Ceramic Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/AB/12/2024, judgement delivered on 10^thDecember 2025; per Hon. Justice S.A. Yelwa) the defendant left the claimant with a permanent injury, described as: ‘severity of the injury on the cheek, jaw, and a paralysed right hand’. In an effort to remedy this breach of duty of care, the court awarded the claimant the sum of ₦25,000,000 (Twenty Million Naira).

Somewhat distinct from the above, the claim in Mr. Bayem P. Mirabel v Top steel Nig. Limited & 2 Ors (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/570/2017, judgement delivered on 24^th July 2025; per Hon. Justice Ikechi Gerald Nweneka) succeeded to a lesser extent. Here, the court found that the 1^st defendant had failed in its duty of care to ensure the availability of safe equipment for its workers. The lack of said equipment subsequently led to the claimant suffering an injury to his right foot when he fell off a tractor at the 1^st defendant’s company. Though still caused by the defendant’s breach, as it did not result in a permanent injury, the court awarded the claimant the equivalent of two years’ salary as compensation.

Applying the law to the facts in Mr. Frank Eneh v Alkem Nigeria Ltd (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/88/2020, judgement delivered on 23^rd May 2025; per Hon. Justice (Prof) Elizabeth A. Oji), the Court held that the stoppage of the claimant’s salaries while he was undergoing medical treatment due to injuries sustained at work was wrongful. In the Court’s words, ‘The Defendant’s reason for stopping the Claimant’s wages would have been accepted, if the Claimant was not rendered unable to attend to his duties, by the Defendant’s negligence. It is considered unfair labour practice to terminate or stop paying an employee who is temporarily absent due to injury. See Article 6 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention (ILO/C/158) which makes it clear that temporary absence from work because of illness or injury shall not constitute valid reason for termination – https//www.ilo.org/wcms_100768, as per ILO conventions. The Claimant is entitled to this relief. I declare that the failure of the Defendant to pay the Claimant’s salary while he was undergoing medical treatment due to injury sustained at work is wrongful.’ The defendant was also held liable for failing to provide safety equipment for the claimant. In awarding compensatory damages, the court held: ‘I have found that the Defendant breached his duty of care, which led to the injury suffered by the Claimant. The Claimant is blind in one eye due to the injury sustained at work, as confirmed by medical reports. The Defendant did not have insurance or an employee compensation scheme to cover the Claimant’s injury. This Court has the authority to award compensation in cases of workplace injuries. The Claimant has asked for ₦15,000,000. I award the sum of ₦10,000,000.00 to the Claimant as damages for the loss of one eye, suffered by the Claimant, in the course of his employment.’

The case of Mr. Emeka Ezeafulukwe v Young Shall Grow Motors Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/262/2020, judgement delivered on 22^nd May 2025; per Hon. Justice Ikechi Gerald Nweneka) serves as a slight detour from the above industrial injury matters, as it deals with the failure to provide adequate insurance. In the instant case, the claimant sought a refund for medical expenses and compensation for the injuries suffered when he was involved in a motor accident while on duty for the defendant company. In its judgment, the Court held the defendant liable to provide care for the claimant, “Since the Defendant failed to maintain a Group Accident Insurance policy and there is no evidence of registration with the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund, the Defendant has a clear duty to provide care for the Claimant.”

Even though it was not expressly sought out on the heads of claim before the court and the proper party was not joined in the action, the real complaint (as deftly noted in passing) in Mr. Barikpe Friday v Trevi Foundations Nigeria LTD (Unreported Suit No. NICN/PHC/104/2017, judgement delivered on 23^rd September 2025; per Hon. Justice Z.M. Bashir, PHD) was that ‘the entries made [by the defendant] for him [the claimant] in relation to his claim for compensation from the NSITF were fraudulent or inadequate’. It was the claimant’s belief that this consequently affected ‘the adequacy or otherwise of the sums paid to him as compensation.’ Hence, the court resolved the narrow question, ‘as to whether the court can entertain a claim for damages in favour of a person who is already receiving statutory compensation from the NSITF for the same injury sustained in the course of employment’, in the negative. The focus for the decision in this regard was section 12(1) and (6) of the NSITF Act.

Bringing to sharp focus the Occupational Safety and Health Recommendation, 1981 (No. 164) made pursuant to ILO C155, and based on the factual matrix at hand, the Court in Abbey Iyobu Robert v Port Harcourt Electricity Distribution Plc (Unreported Suit No. NICN/PHC/43/2024, judgement delivered on 1^st July 2025; per Hon. Justice M.A. Hamza) held that ‘This Court is saddled by S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution together with S. 13&15 of the National Industrial Court Act [NICA] to take into consideration the questions of unfair Labour Practices and International best Labour Practices, Conventions and International Labour Standards in the adjudication of labour cases in Nigeria so that, the Nigerian labour practice and jurisprudence are cosmopolitan in essence and outlook to attract the best International labour and investments into Nigeria. Article 10(c) of Occupational Safety and Health Recommendation, 1981 (No. 164) made pursuant to ILO C155 provides thus: “The obligations placed upon employers with a view of achieving the objective set forth in Article 16 of the Convention might include, as appropriate for different branches of economic activity and different types of work, the following: (a) …(b) …(c) to provide adequate supervision of work, of work practices and of application and use of occupational safety and health measures…”Nigeria ratified ILO C155 May 3, 1994 and by virtue of S. 254C-(2) of the Constitution, it is fully applicable in Nigeria. ILO R164 made pursuant to it is automatically fully applicable in Nigeria too by the doctrine of incorporation by reference – NORTHERN ASSURANCE CO. LTD V. WURAOLA (1969) LPELR-25562 (SC) 11-13, C-E and IWUOHA V. NIGERIA RAILWAY CORPORATION (1997) LPELR-1570 (SC) 16, A-C. In any case, the ILO rule is that a recommendation made pursuant to a Convention forms part of it and shows the extent of its application and interpretation. It is clear from the above that an employer has the burden duties to ensure that she/he did not only provide but that the worker uses the safety gadgets / protocol she/he provided in order to eschew accidents.’

In the case under reference, the court found (from the medical report tendered in evidence) that the workplace injury sustained by the claimant ‘caused him permanent disfiguration, serious trauma, inconveniences, pains as a result of near-death electrocution… the burn which he suffered to his upper limbs, anterior trunk and face and as a result of the Defendant’s negligent in the breach of duty.’ The claimant was thus held entitled to general damages (against the defendant) in the sum of ₦20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) only, for the injuries which he suffered from the accident that occasioned permanent deformity.

In Amadi Ambrose Agbobi v SAIT Nigeria Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/PHC/112/2021, judgement delivered on 4^th February 2025; per Hon. Justice N.C.S Ogbuanya), the claimant’s claim succeeded only in part. Here, he was awarded the ‘sum of ₦20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) against the Defendant in favour of the Claimant, as compensation by way of general damages, arising from the Defendant’s breach of duty of care owed to him, which resulted in damage of the functionality of his right hand, which is of permanent nature, coupled with acts of unfair labour practice by conniving and attempting to deny him compensation for permanent injury under the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF) Insurance scheme, upon sustaining the injury in the industrial accident’.

In Paul Okwuchukwu Chukwuma v Inner Galaxy Steel Ltd (Unreported Suit No. NICN/PHC/19/2023, judgement delivered on 8^th May 2025; per Hon. Justice Z.M. Bashir) the claimant’s contention was that the injury sustained as a result of the workplace accident resulted in permanent incapacity from doing manual work or strenuous activity in the future. Thus, he sought compensation for same, with the defendant denying, inter alia, that the injury was of permanent nature. In order to arrive at the appropriate compensatory threshold, the Court considered the distinct concepts of ‘injury’ and “permanent total disability” under the Employment Compensation Act. Upon doing so, the court found that there was ‘insufficient medical evidence establishing that the injury sustained by the claimant meets the statutory threshold for permanent total disability. The claimant has not tendered any expert medical opinion confirming that the injury has resulted in a condition persisting beyond 12 months or permanently impairing his ability to work or engage in societal life as defined under the Act. Accordingly, while this court finds that the claimant indeed suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of employment with the defendant, thus satisfying the initial threshold for compensation under Section 7(1) of ECA, however, there is a failure to establish that the injury qualifies as a serious, total and permanent injury within the meaning of the claim as specifically couched in relief two. In view of all the foregoing the claimant failed to adduce credible and current medical evidence demonstrating that the injury sustained qualifies as a serious, total and permanent disability. The court accepts that the claimant’s condition constitutes temporary total disability and by virtue of Section 23, 24, 25 of ECA, the claimant is entitled to compensation.Although the defendant contends that the claimant continued to receive support post-accident, the records in Exhibit D2, D3 and C15 (a-e) reveal inconsistent payment and the claimant’s exact monthly salary remains unproven by cogent and credible evidence such as payslip or the letter of appointment or even the statement of account. Nevertheless the defendant had knowledge of the accident which occurred within its premises, but failed to fulfill its statutory duty to report same to the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF) as required under Section 5 and 6 of the Act. In line with the provision of Section 32(d) of the Act, compensation is ordinarily to be paid by NSITF board upon due application. However, having failed to report the accident the defendant remains vicariously liable for the payment of compensation due to the claimant under the Act. Accordingly, and in line with paragraph 2 of the 2^nd schedule to the ECA which rates injury to the claimant arm at 90%, this court finds that the claimant is entitled to compensation amounting to 90% of his monthly remuneration commencing from October 2017 and continuing for a period of 17 years being the remainder of his working life until the statutory retirement age of 55 years as provided in paragraph 7 of the claimant statement of claim undisputed by the defendant’.

Termination: One Flaw, Too Many…

Whether arising from forced resignations, denial of fair hearing, abuse of disciplinary powers, executive lawlessness, or even discrimination cloaked as administrative action, the Courts made it clear in 2025 that one defect in process could oftentimes be enough to unravel an otherwise defensible disengagement.

Consistent with the thrust of the case put forward in Adeniji Funmilayo Foyekemi & 19 Ors v United Bank for Africa Plc. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/286/2020; judgment delivered on 13^th November, 2025; per Honourable Justice I.G Nweneka), the Court faulted the defendant’s termination of the claimants, agreeing that they were constructively discharged from work. The court however declined the ₦400,000,000.00 (Four Hundred Million Naira) claim for breach of contract and wrongful termination, holding that the workers had already received their terminal benefits, including salary in lieu of notice, and that “there is no evidence to support the assertion that the terminal benefits were incorrectly calculated.”

The case of Mr. Akintoye Daniel Oyeyele v. Nigerian Copyright Commission & Anor. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/377/2023, judgment delivered on 26^th May, 2025; per Hon. Justice E.D. Subilim) exemplifies thenew labour jurisprudence that termination without due reason given is in breach of international best practices, as provided in Article 4 of the Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158) and Recommendation No. 166 of the ILO, courtesy of the 3rd Alteration Act 2010 and the provisions of Section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act.Thelatter in particular, in specific terms, made it obligatory that the NICN should have recourse to good or international best practices in labour or industrial relations.

In Engr. Godwin Okpiavbe v. Communication Clean Energy Technoloy (CCETC) Ogua Energy (Unreported Suit No. NICN/BEN/45/2022, judgment delivered on 1^st July, 2025; per Hon. Justice A.A. Adewemimo), the Court found that a forced resignation from employment in the presence of armed military escorts under the defendant’s directive was “wrongful, oppressive, and a violation of labour laws.”

Similarly, in Ojo Gabriel Olasunkanmi v United Bank for Africa Plc (Unreported Suit No. NICN/YEN/13/2024, judgement delivered on 12^th May 2025; per Hon. Justice P.I. Hamman), the Court held that the defendant forcing the claimant to resign against his will amounted to forced resignation or constructive disengagement.

On the finding that there was no evidence that the ‘claimant was ever invited to the Disciplinary Committee or that the claimant was served with the alleged dismissal letter or any piece of evidence to show that the alleged Committee even sat at all’, the court in Mr. Fatoba Olugbenga John v First Bank Nigeria Ltd (Unreported Suit No. NICN/IL/04/2019; judgment delivered on 20^th May 2025; per Hon. Justice K.D Damulak) set aside the alleged dismissal (purportedly done in 2011), with a consequential order directing the payment of arrears of salaries for the period of 8 years (2010-2018), calculated up to when the claimant voluntarily resigned (2018).

Despite the fact that the claimant in Private Etim Idorenyin Anthony v. The Nigerian Army (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/350/2022, judgment delivered on 5^th June, 2025; per Hon. Justice Sinmisola O. Adeniyi) was unsuccessful in her sought (but unproven) declaratory relief that the defendant subjecting her to hard labour during the advanced stage of her pregnancy, denying her maternity leave, and denying her newborn baby the required medical treatment were wrongful and discriminatory labour practices and constituted maltreatment of an employee, she was nonetheless able to establish on the cold facts before the court that her summary trial and dismissal without being afforded a fair hearing was flawed. In addition to an award of damages, she was ordered to be re-instated back to the Army.

In the case of Dr. Fredrick Oluwafemi Akinfala v. Nigeria Police Trustfund & Anor. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/151/2022, judgment delivered on 30^thMay, 2025; per Hon. Justice O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae), the Court firstly affirmed an appellate court’s earlier citation that the mere provision in the Public Service Rules requiring aggrieved parties to follow internal grievance remedial measures does not make the exhaustion of those internal remedies a pre-condition for recourse to Court. Following this, the court delivered an instructive ruling on its own disciplinary powers by granting the orders the claimant sought, namely, the setting aside of queries and letters issued to the claimant by the defendant during the pendency of the suit. Naturally, these adversely affected the subject matter of the suit, which led the court to hold that the said letters and queries were in contempt of court and were merely issued to steal a match on the claimant.

Not to stray too far from statutory expectations however, the Court, in Ikem Chiejina Victor v. Comptroller General of Prisons & 3 Ors (Unreported Suit No. NICN/AWK/32/2019, judgment delivered on 23^rd July, 2025; per Hon. Justice J.I. Targema PhD),held that the claimant’s purported dismissal was unlawful, unconstitutional, and of no legal effect, as it had not complied with the mandatory procedures under the Public Service Rules and Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Amongst other reliefs, the claimant was reinstated back to his position as Assistant Superintendent of Prisons II or equivalent rank in the Nigerian Correctional Service.

In the case of Mrs. Florence Anikwendu v The Executive Governor of Abia State& 4 Ors (Unreported Suit No. NICN/PHC/33/2024, judgement delivered on 9^th July 2025; per Hon. Justice F.I Kola-Olalere. (FCIArb)), the Court, upon holding first that the claimant was not properly disengaged from the service of the defendants, and second, that the disengagement in question was not in compliance with Abia State Government Public of Service Rules, frowned upon and ultimately held as discriminatory and unconstitutional, the defendants’ Circular which transferred the services of the claimant from the Abia State Civil Service, on the grounds that she is not an indigene of Abia.

Similarly, the Court, in Hon. Justice Maurice A. Ikpambese v. National Judicial Council & 5 Ors. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/68/2025, judgment delivered on 23^rdJuly, 2025; per Hon. Justice O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae),frowned at the executive lawlessness that purported to remove the Chief Judge of Benue state, in defiance of the constitutional stipulation for the removal from judicial officers.

In a finding ofwrongful and unfair dismissal, the Court, in Chalibeda B. Gonzuk v. Agric Services Training Centre and Marketing Ltd. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/JOS/20/2023, judgment delivered on 2^nd October, 2025; per Hon. Justice I.S. Galadima), held that vesting both investigatory and decision-making powers in the same body denied the claimant a fair hearing. In that case, it was emphasised that the provisions of a company’s handbook cannot suffice as an authority to make a “criminal finding of vehicle theft,” as only a criminal court may do that. The Court went on to state that by the defendant effectively turning its internal disciplinary process into a “theft tribunal,” the employer exceeded the limits of its own policy.

In awarding the sum of ₦10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only as exemplary damages against the defendant for the ill-treatment and injustice suffered by the claimant from 2011 to time of judgment (2025), the court in Mrs. Liatu Daniel v. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University Teaching Hospital Bauchi (Unreported Suit No. NICN/BAU/22/2017, judgment delivered on 12^th February, 2025; per Hon. Justice Mustapha Tijani) rightly intoned the new labour jurisprudential shift towards compensating employees for damages beyond mere salary in lieu of notice. This aligns with international best practices in labour relations, and applies even in employment relationships tainted with statutory flavour.

In Engr. Seiyaboh Oyinkuro v Federal Polytechnic, Ekowe Bayelsa (Unreported Suit No. NICN/YEN/06/2023, judgement delivered on 24^th July 2025; per Hon. Justice Bashar A. Alkali) the Court found that the claimant’s receipt of salaries from two full-time paid employment roles amounted to gross misconduct under Section 100402 (r) of the Public Service Rules 2021. That singular misconduct was deemed grave enough to warrant a dismissal of the claimant from the service of the defendant, with the defendant being entitled to a refund of the salaries paid to the claimant for the period that the claimant held two full-time paid employments.

Contrariwise, and on the peculiar facts of Mrs Mercy Nwachukwu v Standard Microfinance Bank (Unreported Suit No. NICN/YL/15/2022; judgment delivered on 15^th May 2022, per Hon. Justice J.T Agbadu Fishim), the question of whether a termination or dismissal arising from allegations involving both misconduct and negligence, as well as the falsification of records and misrepresentation of fact was valid, was answered in the affirmative. Here, the court restated that where there was a thin line between whether the alleged acts of the employee amount to civil misconduct or criminal, the employer can safely exercise its disciplinary power under the misconduct, to terminate or dismiss the employee. In such an instance, the employer need not wait for the outcome of the criminal proceedings, upon charging the employee to Court to deal with the criminal element.

Relatedly, on the peculiar facts in Benus Musa v Savannah Sugar Company Ltd Numan & 5 Ors. (Unreported Suit No. NICN/YL/22/2020; judgment delivered on 5^th March 2022, per Hon. Justice J.T Agbadu Fishim), the court held that ‘the admission of the commission of the alleged theft by the claimant entitled the 1^st defendant to summarily dismiss the claimant without further enquiry’.

Miscellany

In a rather uplifting decision that underscores the human element essential to justice, the Court in Oyelami Olufemi v Ecobank Nigeria Limited (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/310/2019, judgement delivered on 23^rd May 2025; per Hon. Justice (Prof) Elizabeth A. Oji), equitably applied the principle of approximation. This enabled the claimant – who had been terminated without any stated reason, with only 5 days remaining before he reached the 15 years of service benchmark – to still receive the computation of his severance pay and other work-related perquisites he would have been entitled to had he completed 15 years of continuous service with the defendant bank.

The case of Lois Sankey v Mastercard Foundation (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/354/2023, judgement delivered on 30^th June 2025; per Hon. Justice S.A. Yelwa) was instructivein affirming that the termination of an employment due to harassment or engagement in vexatious comments or conduct against a co-employee in a work place, where such conduct is known – or ought reasonably to be known – to be unwelcome, is justified and valid.

Etuk Usen v Oriental Energy Resources Limited & Anor (Unreported Suit No. NICN/UY/47/2022; judgment delivered on 19^th June 2025, per Hon Justice S.H Danjidda) offers a fresh perspective on the applicability of the provisions of the Guidelines for the Release of Staff in Nigeria Oil and Gas Industry 2019. The factual perspective, namely, whether an employer can terminate an employee when it has written to ‘notify’ the Minister of Petroleum (in line with the rules) of its intention to terminate a staff, but is yet to get a response, was captured by the court thus: ‘In light of the above therefore, I wish to observe that having the Defendants taken all the necessary procedures by giving the claimant a query and constituting a Disciplinary Committee in disciplining the claimant for the infraction that he has committed, the Defendants do not need to wait for the approval of the DPR before they ultimately terminated the claimant. After all, the Defendants had written an application dated 10/11/2020 (Exhibit DW2 (9a) to the DPR which was received on 16/11/2020, the Defendants however went ahead to terminate the claimant without the approval of the DPR which up till now has not been given. The question that agitates my mind is that, will the Defendants wait indefinitely for the approval of the DPR even after all necessary measures have been taken to discipline the Claimant. I think not.’

The case of Mr. Anthony Agweye Akombende v Fidelity Bank PLC (Unreported Suit No. NICN/PHC/143/2022, judgement delivered on 19th September 2025; per Hon. Justice Z.M. Bashir, PHD) was particularly enlightening, as the Court expatiated on the fact that the coming into force of the Pension Reform Act, 2014 does not automatically nullify existing private contractual arrangements on gratuity, unless they are inconsistent with the Act or are expressly varied by the parties. The Court held here that notwithstanding the Act, the claimant was still entitled to payment of gratuity, in accordance with the defendant’s staff handbook.

Esther Aderanti Kolade v Adekunle Olanipekun LP (Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/217/2025, judgment delivered on 2nd December, 2025; per Hon. Justice O.Y Anuwe) was a significant test case in which the claimant sought to have the Court pronounce, that part of the obligations on the part of employers of legal practitioners, was the obligation to pay their employees’ annual Bar practice fees. Upon a thorough and thoughtful examination of the relevant provisions of the claimant’s specified contract of employment, as well as the Legal Practitioners’ Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct, the court held that “There is no provision in the LPA or the RPC which shifts or transfers that obligation to law firms or organizations who employed lawyers.”

The year 2025 solidified the NICN’s role as the guardian of fairness in the modern workplace. With the ‘watchword’ of ‘international Best Practices’ and an expanding jurisprudence on unfair labour practices, the NICN consistently prioritised access to justice and procedural integrity over rigidity or employer convenience. As ever modernising workplaces and looming economic pressure continue to – for better or for worse – reshape Nigeria’s labour landscape in 2026 and beyond, the protective trajectory the Courts adopted last year serves as a good omen for things to come. One where the modern workplace is not merely a site of soulless contracts, but a space governed by fairness, accountability, and human dignity. All rights which should be non-negotiable and judicially enforceable.

Folabi Kuti SAN is the Lead Partner at Union Attorneys (Incorporating KutiLegal).

folabikuti@kutilegal.com; unionattorneys@kutilegal.com.

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A Review of Significant Decisions in Labour and Employment Matters – 2025

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