Before Joining the Bandwagon of Confusion: A Revisit of the Use of the Word ‘Barrister’ As An Honorific

By what will seem to be an internal memo of the Supreme Court of Nigeria dated 13 July 2026 and headed ‘Prohibition of the Use of the Title “Barrister” As a Prefix to Names’, a communication, passed across by the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court on behalf of the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), holds the opinion that the ‘use of the title “Barrister” as a prefix to names is inappropriate and inconsistent with the standards of professionalism expected within the Supreme Court of Nigeria”. The memo consequently directs ‘all officers concerned’ to discontinue the use of the word ‘barrister’ as a prefix to a name in all official engagements with immediate effect. This development, particularly because it is coming from the office of the CJN, has captured the interest of the legal community both in Nigeria and abroad, vis-à-vis the interest of non-lawyers who are curious about the reason for the development. A good number of lawyers who are obviously uncomfortable with the use of ‘barrister’ as a title have supported the development, and for most of them, they did so without even seeking to know if there is any basis for this under Nigerian law or the lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.

In this article, I have contended that (assuming without conceding that the memo is intended to bind or apply to all lawyers in Nigeria) the Honourable CJN lacks the constitutional and statutory powers to make such directive. This article also contends that part of the decision of the LPDC in NBA v. Ofomata (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1557) 128, where the use of ‘barrister’ as an honorific came up, does not till date have any binding effect on lawyers in Nigeria that elect to use the word ‘barrister’ as a prefix to their names. The article further contends that LPDC does not currently have any legal, statutory, professional or moral basis to ban or prohibit the use of the word ‘barrister’ as a prefix to the names of legal practitioners that elect to use it.

Like many officials and authorities in Nigeria and anywhere in the world, the powers of the CJN are best described as qualified, cornered and caged. The CJN, being a constitutional designation given to the holder and administrative leader of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, does not have unlimited or blanket powers, particularly powers that cut across direct regulation of the legal profession in Nigeria. The extent of what the CJN can do or regulate is as provided in the laws enabling the CJN to act in the first place, particularly the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria. The office of the CJN was established by section 230(2) of the Constitution. In addition to the strict power of adjudication conferred on the CJN just like other justices of the Supreme Court, section 236 of the Constitution empowers the CJN to ‘make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court’.  That is it, and nothing more. It is pursuant to this power that the successive rules of procedure of the Supreme Court have been made by different past CJNs.

We must be clear that calling unprofessional the use of the title ‘barrister’ as an honorific and directing that lawyers (within the Supreme Court) should not use it in their official communications with the Court is an act of regulation of the legal profession, and that clearly does not come within the CJN’s power of making rules of procedure and practice under section 236.   There are two major reasons the said memo issued by the CJN could not have been effectively made under section 236 of the Constitution. First, to appropriately act under section 236, whatever the CJN is making must strictly be made by ‘rules’ of court, and it must relate only to ‘practice and procedure of the Supreme Court’. Section 9 of the Supreme Court Act further clarifies this when it provides that ‘the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court shall be in accordance with… Rules of Court’. Second, as said before, section 236 does not extend the power of the CJN to direct regulation of the legal profession in Nigeria. For these two reasons, the CJN’s memo is void to the extent that it is sought to apply to lawyers or legal practitioners in Nigeria. While from the language and reading of the memo it is clear that the memo may not have been intended to apply to all lawyers in Nigeria, it must be stated at once and unequivocally  that the CJN does not have any constitutional basis or powers to, by a memo or whatever means, prohibit any lawyer from the use of the word ‘barrister’ as a prefix to their name in all official engagements with the Supreme Court.

As this is the case, the relevant question is ‘where did the CJN supposedly derive the power to prohibit lawyers from using the title “Barrister” as a prefix to names? This question takes us to relevant statutes and subsidiary legislation that empower the CJN to act in certain official capacities, either personally or in conjunction with members of certain bodies. These relevant statutes and subsidiary legislation include the Supreme Court Act, the National Judicial Institute Act, the Legal Practitioners’ Act, the Supreme Court Rules and the Rules of Professional Conduct 2023. Interestingly, none of these statutes and subsidiary legislation empowers the CJN to regulate lawyers’ use of title or prohibit lawyers from using ‘barrister’ as an honorific. The Honourable CJN, therefore, lacks the constitutional and statutory powers to make such directive contained in the memo as it pertains to lawyers. With the greatest respect, the opinion expressed in the memo that the ‘use of  “barrister” is inappropriate and inconsistent with the standards of professionalism’ is at best a personal opinion of the Honourbable CJN, which has no binding force on any lawyer that elects to use ‘barrister’ as an honorific in Nigeria. It is unprocedural to attempt to do by a memo or a directive what can only be done or achieved through legislation or adjudication. The Honourable CJN and other justices of the Supreme Court interested in this issue must wait until the matter becomes subject of litigation, and when that day comes, it will serve posterity and our jurisprudence well for the Supreme Court to ensure that its position on the issue is grounded in law and use of English, and not sentiment or personal opinion.

There has been a ‘scary’ amount of misinformation and confusion among lawyers on the position of the LPDC on the use of the word ‘barrister’ as an honorific and the position taken by the LPDC in the case of NBA v. Ofomata. It is important to say that in 2017, the issue took root from the position taken by the learned Sylvester Udemezue, Esq. in one of his articles on the matter where he condemned the use of ‘barrister’ as an honorific and held the view that same had been judicially decided by the LPDC in NBA v. Ofomata. I immediately j0ined issues with him, and between both of us, about six back and forth articles were written on the issue. I will be bringing back some of the salient arguments I put forward back then. I have in addition read the recent article written by the learned Sylvester Udemezue, Esq and published online on 2 August 2026, which is a rejoinder to the clarification of the CJN’s directive made by Ubani, SAN. I noticed that Udemezue, Esq’s position in his current article is largely a reproduction of the same arguments we traded back in 2017. I will, as well, bring some of my arguments forth. The immediate point that must be made is that the LPDC till date has not made any binding decision (either in NBA v. Ofomata or any other case) that prohibits a lawyer from using ‘barrister’ as a prefix to their name. What most writers and commentators (including my very dear and respected Udemezue, Esq.) did back then and are doing right now is to under-represent and under-report what transpired in NBA v. Ofomata that brought about the LPDC’s comment on the use of ‘barrister’ as a prefix to a lawyer’s name. Deliberate underreporting or under-representation of the issues decided by the court or a tribunal is a practice that can easily bring confusion and mislead unsuspecting members of the public and the legal profession. What most commentators and writers on this issue failed to set about this case, I will set it out clearly here to show that NBA v. Ofomata is not a binding authority at all on the issue.

The case of NBA v. Ofomata is case of a lawyer named Ofomata, heard by the LPDC. The case relates to fraudulent procurement by Ofomata of the title documents of another person, which Ofomata misrepresented to another lawyer that he was the owner of the land. As a result, the other lawyer (acting for his client) paid Ofomata the sum of N5,940,000.00, and a deed of assignment was executed between Ofomata and the other lawyer’s client. After discovering the fraud, the other lawyer asked for return of his money, but the Respondent did not pay it back. The lawyer eventually placed a complaint before the NBA against the Ofamata. From there, the complaint got to the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) after the NBA had found a prima facie case against Ofomata. A three-count charge was filed by the NBA against Ofomata before the LPDC. The singular issue before the LPDC for determination was “whether or not the Respondent by his conduct with the Petitioner [the other lawyer] violated the provisions of the Rules 1, 10, 21, 24, 49, 52 and 55 of the RPC and thereby guilty of infamous conduct.” The decision of the LPDC was (and rightly so) based only on this issue before it. LPDC found Ofomata guilty of infamous conduct and his name was struck off the roll of legal practitioners in Nigeria.

It is salient to note that the use or otherwise of the word ‘barrister’ as a prefix before a lawyer’s name was never in issue in the case. At the same time, none of Rules 1, 10, 21, 24, 49, 52 and 55 of the RPC 2007, which the LPDC considered in reaching its decision, prohibits or borders on the use or otherwise of the word ‘barrister’ as a prefix before a lawyer’s name. Nevertheless, while the judgment of the LPDC was being delivered by J.B Daudu (SAN), he said, by way of obiter, on page 133 that:

“We observed that in the 3 counts, the Complainant referred to a legal practitioner by name ‘Ikenna C. Ofoma’…as ‘Barrister Ikenna C. Ofoma’. The appellation of ‘Barrister’ as a title before the name of a legal practitioner is unprofessional and improper; we therefore struck out the title ‘Barrister’ in each of the 3 counts whenever it was meant to describe the said Ikenna C. Ofoma ESQ.”

The law is settled that mere observations by the court of law or a tribunal like the LPDC cannot constitute a binding ratio decidendi of the court or a tribunal. Such observations made by the court can only operate as obiter dicta. The Supreme Court has continued to reiterate this point. In Onofowokan v. Weman Bank Plc (2011) NSCQLR vol. 45, 181 S.C.pp.45-46, paras. F-B, the Supreme Court, defining an obiter dictum and its effect held that:

“What is then an obiter dictum? This question has been answered by my learned brother Edozie JSC in the case of AIC Ltd v. NNPC (2005) 11 NWLR (pt. 937) 563 at 589, when his Lordship held as follows:- “obiter dicta reflect, inter alia, the opinion of the judgment of the Judge which does not embody the resolution of the court. The expression of judge in a judgment must be taken with reference to the facts of the case which he is deciding the issues calling for decision and answers to those issues“.

In LAWAL (Obobahin of Ihima) v OHIDA (2009) LPELR-CA/A/181/06, pp.71-72, paras G-A, it was held that:

There is a distinction between a ”ratio decidendi” and an ”obiter dictum”. The ”ratio decidendi” of a case represents the reasoning or principle or ground upon which a case is decided. An ”obiter” simply means, in passing or incidental or cursory. An “obiter dictum’ reflects, “inter alia’; the opinions of the Judge, which do not embody the resolutions of the court. See the cases of: (1) Osafile V. Odi (No.1) 0990 3 NWLR (pt. 137) p. 130; (2) A.I.C Ltd V. NNPC (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) P. 563 and (3) Awakunle V. NEPA (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt. 10.57) p. 340.”

The Supreme Court again in AG Kwara State v. Lawal (2017) LPELR-42347(SC), p.11, paras D-F reiterated again that:

“An obiter dictum is just a mere side talk or remark made or expressed by a Judge in his decision upon a case which side talk, remark or opinion is just by the way or is merely collateral or incidental and not really directly upon the question or issue before the Court for decision. See ONAFOWOKAN & ORS. v. WEMA BANK PLC. & ORS. (2011) 5 SC. [pt. II); BAMIGBOYE v. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (1999) 6 SCN 324.” Per EKO, J.S.C. (P. 11, Paras. D-F)

Further, making a distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum, the Supreme Court came out very emphatic in another decision that observations will constitute nothing but an obita dictum. In Atanda v. Hon. Commissioner for Lands and Housing, Kwara State (2017) LPELR-42346(SC), pp.9-19, paras D-D, the Apex Court held that:

The decision of the lower Court was not linked with the remarks of the learned justice of the Court below at all. That is to say, it is not ratio decidendi of the decision which is the subject matter of this appeal. On the other hand, “ratio decidendi” is the reason on which the Court based its judgment or it is the principle of the decision, unlike obiter dictum. The latter simply entails comments or passing remarks by a judge or Court or its observation(s) which is certainly not meant to be the principle or the basis upon which the decision of the Court was based or hinged on. It is simply an observation or mere passing remarks or comment. Such remarks, comment or observation(s) is no doubt not meant to play any part in the decision the Court arrived at in its judgment.“Per SANUSI, J.S.C. (Pp. 9-10, Paras. D-D)

In line with all the authorities of the Apex court cited above, it is more than clear that the observation and comment made by the LPDC on the use of “barrister” before the name of the lawyer in question is nothing but an obiter dictum which is  not binding, as it does not form part of the judgment of the LPDC for the following reasons:

a) The use or otherwise of the word ‘barrister’ was never an issue before the LPDC.

b) None of the parties brought it up before the LPDC as an issue for determination and it was never raised as an issue by the LPDC suo motu.

c) The use or otherwise of the word ‘barrister’ has no weight on the judgment of the LPDC neither does it affect the judgment of the LPDC in anyway. It is not the reason on which the LPDC based its judgment.

d) The use or otherwise of the word ‘barrister’ is not the principle upon which the judgment was based. Even the LPDC confirmed that it was an observation.

e) Parties were never called to address the LPDC on its appropriateness or otherwise under the RPC. None of all the rules of RPC relied on by the LPDC to determine the case prohibits the use of the word ‘barrister’ either directly or impliedly.

f) The observation of the LPDC on the issue of “barrister” cannot be appealed, as it is settled law that only opinions emanating from the ratio decidendi or the issues before the court may be appealed against.

For those who have been diligent enough and done their assignment very well, they will discover that there is actually nothing in the Legal Practitioners Act, the defunct Rules of Professional Conduct 2007 and the extant Rules of Professional Conduct 2023 that prohibit the use of ‘barrister’ as a prefix to a lawyer’s name. The correct current position is that there is presently no law, judgment or rules of practice in Nigeria prohibiting a lawyer from using the word “barrister” as a prefix before his or her name, and neither the CJN or the LPDC has jurisdiction to make regulations on same directly or indirectly. Just like the CJN, the powers of the LPDC are qualified, cornered and caged within the provisions of its enabling law. LPDC does not currently have any legal, statutory, professional or moral basis to ban or prohibit the use of the word ‘barrister’ as a prefix to the names of legal practitioners that elect to use same. This goes to show the reason that neither the CJN’s directive nor the LPDC’s decision in NBA v. Ofomata referred to any specific law or rules that prohibit the use of ‘barrister’ as an honorific by a lawyer.

Since authorities such as the CJN and the LPDC have not really referenced any specific and unequivocal laws or rules pursuant to which they held such position about the use of ‘barrister’ as an honorific by lawyers, what I have discovered from certain commentators and writers is that they are hinging the supposed ‘impropriety’ of the wrong use of English Grammar. For example, Udemezue, Esq. argued in his 2017 and now aldo2026 articles that the word ‘barrister’ is a noun that describes a member of the legal profession or a professional qualification, and it cannot be used as an adjective. He argued further that the word ‘barrister’ does not belong to ‘the same grammatical and conventional category as Mr, Mrs, Miss, Ms, Dr, Professor or Chief.’ Surprisingly, he did not provide any grammatical support for this supposition. As I noted back them in my rejoinder article and I am again noting now, this argument is faulty, as it is definitely oblivious of the fact that in English Grammar, there are times the rules permit nouns to be used as adjectives. This usually happens when one noun is serving as a qualifier for another noun.

A good knowledge of English Grammar is a hydra headed weapon in the hands of a lawyer, and now is the time to put it to use. In English Grammar, there are nine (9) parts of speech, namely: article, noun, pronoun, adjective, verb, adverb, conjunction, preposition and determiner. It is very wrong to assume that an English word must belong only to one of the nine parts of speech. By their nature, certain English words may belong to two or more parts of speech. I believe this is trite, but we still must talk about it since we have joined issues on it. It normally happens that the English words that belong to two or more parts of speech usually do so under two circumstances:

a) Those that naturally belong to two or more parts of speech by their dictionary meanings. Examples include water (noun & verb) and plant (noun & verb); and

b) Those that belong to two or more parts of speech by usage or coinage. Examples include animal (when used as an adjective to qualify a noun that follows it— as in Animal farm, Animal feed, Animal areas etc). Under this grammatical principle, nouns may be used as adjectives to qualify other nouns. Other examples in this regard include Doctor Smith, Justice Smith, Apostle Smith, Captain Smith, Professor Smith, Barrister Smith, Chief Smith, Engineer Smith and Pastor Smith.

If one checks the parts of speech that the words ‘Doctor’, ‘Justice’, ‘Apostle’, ‘Captain’, ‘Professor’, ‘Barrister’, ‘Chief,’ ‘Engineer’ and ‘Pastor’ belong to in reputable dictionary like Oxford Dictionary and Cambridge Dictionary, one will discover that all of them are tagged ‘nouns’. The question is: does it mean using them as adjectives is grammatically wrong? The answer is an echoing NO! As to the claim that ‘barrister’ cannot be used as a prefix to a lawyer’s name since it ‘describes a member of the legal profession or a professional qualification’, are doctors, engineers and architects not members of their own professions or professional qualifications? These are real life examples that are on all fours with a barrister. How do we reconcile the argument that it is grammatically and logically correct to address a doctor as Dr. Ramos; an engineer as Engr. Ramos; a surveyor as Surv. Ramos; a town planner as Tpl Ramos; an estate surveyor and valuer as ESV. Ramos; a pharmacist as Pharm. Ramos; a military officer as Capt. Ramos, Gen. Ramos or Col. Ramos; and a judge as Justice Ramos, but all of a sudden, addressing a lawyer called to the bar as Barr. Ramos becomes offensive and unprofessional? Speaking plainly and without any intention to degrade anyone, that level of argument carry the stain of  uncriticality. That is why it currently has no basis in law and English Grammar.

I have shown in this article that neither the LPDC nor the CJN currently under our laws has the powers to prohibit lawyers from using the word ‘barrister’ as a prefix to their names. I have also shown that NBA v. Ofomata did not decide that lawyers should stop using the word ‘barrister’ as a prefix to their names, and the decision is not binding on lawyers that elect to do so. This confusion and misinformation must stop.  For those that argue that jurisdictions such as the UK and the US do not use ‘barrister’ as an honorific,  they need to be asked if in those jurisdictions lawyers announce their appearance or write their names in official correspondences with traditional and social prefixes such as ‘Chief’, ‘High Chief’, ‘Double Chief’, ‘Prince’ and ‘Princess’, which today have ironically become an acceptable pattern to both the bar and the bench in Nigeria. Yes, it is indeed ironical because while a lawyer called to the bar  who is indeed a barrister is being prevented from using a non-offensive prefix like ‘barrister’, lawyers using far-fetched prefixes such as ‘Chief’, ‘High Chief’, ‘Double Chief’, ‘Prince’ and ‘Princess’ are being condoned. For me, I cannot wrap my head around it and the fuss about the use of ‘barrister’ a prefix. The actual dugbe-dugbe that the bar and the bench should be weary of in advance is the condonation of the use of these far-fetched prefixes, as they have the tendency of bringing about a slippery slope situation in the near future. If tomorrow, I appear in court and announce my appearance with my traditional titles (prefixes) such as Akogun Bolaji Ramos, Asapeola Bolaji Ramos, Apini Bolaji Ramos or social titles such as Ijimere Bolaji Ramos or religious titles such Rev. Bolaji Ramos, Baba-Adinni Bolaji Ramos or Imam Bolaji Ramos, from where will the bench or the bar begin to distinguish and come to the conclusion as to what should be and not be allowed? Most times, the law is only an ass because we human beings make it exactly so.